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Abstract
We describe a new, dynamic, floating-label approach to language-based information flow control. A labeled IO monad,
LIO, keeps track of a current label and permits restricted access to IO functionality. The current label floats to exceed
the labels of all data observed and restricts what can be modified. Unlike other language-based work, LIO also
bounds the current label with a current clearance that provides a form of discretionary access control. Computations
may encapsulate and pass around the results of computations with different labels. In addition, the LIO monad
offers a simple form of labeled mutable references and exception handling. We give precise semantics and prove
confidentiality and integrity properties of a call-by-name λ -calculus and provide an implementation in Haskell.
1 Introduction
Complex software systems are often composed of modules with different provenance, trustworthiness, and
functional requirements. A central security design principle is the principle of least privilege, which says
that each component should be given only the privileges it needs for its intended purpose. In particular,
it is important to differentially regulate access to sensitive data in each section of code. This minimizes
the trusted computing base for each overall function of the system and limits the downside risk if any
component is either maliciously designed or compromised.
Information flow control (IFC) tracks the flow of sensitive data through a system and prohibits code
from operating on data in violation of a security policy. Significant research, development, and experi-
mental effort has been devoted to static information flow mechanisms. Static analysis has a number of
benefits, including reduced run-time overhead, fewer run-time failures, and robustness against implicit
flows (Denning & Denning, 1977). However, static analysis does not work well in environments where
new classes of users and new kinds of data are encountered at run-time. In order to address the needs of
such systems, we describe a new, dynamic, floating-label approach to language-based information flow
control and present an implementation in Haskell.
Our approach uses a Labeled type constructor to protect values by associating them with labels. The
labels themselves are typed values manipulated at run-time, and can thus be created dynamically based on
other data such as a username. Conceptually, at each point in the computation, the evaluation context has
a current label. We use a labeled IO monad, LIO, to keep track of the current label and permit restricted
access to IO functionality (such as a labeled file system), while ensuring that the current label accurately
represents an upper bound on the labels of all data observed or modified. Unlike other language-based
work, LIO also bounds the current label with a current clearance. The clearance of a region of code may
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be set in advance to impose an upper bound on the floating current label within that region. This restricts
data access, limits the amount of code that could manipulate sensitive data, and reduces opportunities to
exploit covert channels. Additionally, we introduce an operator, toLabeled, that allows the result of a
computation that would have raised the current label to be encapsulated within the Labeled type. Finally,
we present combinators for working with labeled references, and exceptions. Thanks to the flexibility
of dynamic checking, LIO implements an IFC mechanism that is more permissive than previous static
approaches (Pottier & Simonet, 2002; Li & Zdancewic, 2010; Russo et al., 2008) but provides similar se-
curity guarantees (Sabelfeld & Russo, 2009). Though purely language-based, LIO explores a new design
point centered on floating labels that draw on past OS work (Zeldovich et al., 2006).
The main features of our system can be understood using the example of an online conference review
system, called λ Chair. In this system, which we describe more fully later in the paper, authenticated users
can read any paper and can normally read any review. This reflects the normal practice in conference
reviewing, for example, where every member of the program committee can see submissions and their
reviews, and participate in related discussion. Users can be added dynamically and assigned to review
specific papers. As an illustration of the power of the labeling system, integrity labels are used to make
sure that only assigned reviewers can write reviews for any given paper. Conversely, confidentiality labels
are used to manage conflicts of interest. Users with a conflict of interest on a specific paper lack the
privileges, represented by confidentiality labels, to read a review. As conflicts of interest are identified,
confidentiality labels on the papers may change dynamically and become more restrictive.
This paper extends an earlier conference version (Stefan et al., 2011b) by including formal proofs and
extending the calculus and library implementation with exception handling. The main contributions of
this work are:
◮ We propose a new design point for IFC systems in which most values in lexical scope are protected by a
single, mutable, current label, yet one can also encapsulate and pass around the results of computations
with different labels. Label encapsulation is explicitly reflected by types in a way that prevents implicit
flows.
◮ We prove information flow and integrity properties of our design and describe LIO, an implementation
of the new model in Haskell. LIO, which can be implemented entirely as a library (relying solely on
type safety), demonstrates both the applicability and simplicity of the approach.
◮ Unlike other language-based work, our model provides a notion of clearance that imposes an upper
bound on the program label, thus providing a form of discretionary access control on portions of the
code, i.e., restricting access to data it “needs to know”.
◮ We present a novel dynamic, yet safe, handling of exceptions. Exceptions are a key component to make
LIO a more practical IFC system.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on information flow control and
our Haskell LIO library. Section 3 presents a motivating scenario where to apply LIO. Formalization of
the library is given in Section 4 and the security guarantees are detailed in Section 5. Related work is
described in Section 6. We conclude in Section 7.
2 Security Library
In this section, we give an overview of information flow control, the approach used by LIO to dynamically
enforce IFC, and the core application programming interface (API) provided by our library.
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Labels and IFC The goal of information flow control is to track the propagation of information and
control it according to a security policy. A well-known policy addressed in almost every IFC system is
non-interference: publicly-readable program results must not depend on secret inputs. A non-interfering
program is guaranteed to preserve confidentiality of sensitive data (Goguen & Meseguer, 1982); dually,
this policy can be used to preserve integrity of trustworthy data (Biba, 1977).
To enforce information flow restrictions, most systems associate labels with every piece of data. A
label represents the level of confidentiality and integrity on data. Labels form a lattice (Denning, 1976)
with partial order⊑ (pronounced “can flow to”);⊑ is used to govern the allowed flows between differently
labeled entities. For instance, if L1 ⊑ L2 holds, it indicates that data with label L1 can flow into entities
labeled L2.
LIO is polymorphic in the label type, allowing different types of labels to be used. Custom label formats
can be created by providing a definition for a bounded lattice. Specifically, a label format must have a
well-defined partial order (⊑), a binary operation computing the join of two labels (⊔), a binary operation
computing the meet of two labels (⊓), and minimum (⊥) and maximum (⊤) elements. For any two labels
L1 and L2, the join has the property that Li ⊑ (L1 ⊔L2), i = 1,2 and L1⊔L2 is the least of such elements
in the lattice; the meet has the property that (L1 ⊓L2) ⊑ Li, i = 1,2 and L1 ⊓L2 is the greatest of such
elements in the lattice. In our Haskell library, label types are instances of the Label type class:
class (Eq l) ⇒ Label l where
leq :: l → l → Bool -- Can flow to relation (⊑)
lub :: l → l → l -- Join operation (⊔)
glb :: l → l → l -- Meet operation (⊓)
lbot :: l -- Minimum element (⊥)
ltop :: l -- Maximum element (⊤)
Henceforth we assume that the bounded lattice property holds for the labels used in our examples.
Section 3 details disjunction category (DC) labels, a concrete label format used int λ Chair that satisfies
this property.
Privileges and Decentralized IFC An extension of IFC, the decentralized label model (DLM) of Myers
and Liskov (Myers & Liskov, 1997) allows for more general applications, including systems consisting of
mutually distrustful parties. In a decentralized system, a computation is executed with a set of privileges
p, which, when exercised, allow the computation to “bypass” certain label restrictions. In such systems,
rather than using the standard⊑ partial order relation, a more permissive pre-order⊑p, is used in the label
comparisons. Consider, for example, a simple four-point lattice ⊥ ⊑ Li ⊑ LAB, for i = A,B. Here, LA, LB,
and LAB respectively correspond to data private to user A, user B, and both A and B. In DLM, privileges
and labels are associated such that, e.g., privilege a corresponding to LA allows user A to “ignore the A” in
labels. Thus, LAB ⊑a LB, even though LAB 6⊑ LB. This property is very useful as it allows A to downgrade
the data from label level LAB to LB. Informally, when downgrading, the code exercising the privilege states
that it no longer considers the data to be confidential (in this case, A exercising a to downgrade data from
LAB to LB). Note that downgrading does not make the data publicly readable, all parties corresponding to
the label must first perform the downgrade.
As in the case of labels, our library is polymorphic in the privilege types. Any code can exercise
privileges (that are in lexical scope) to enforce IFC using the more permissive ⊑p relation. However,
our formalism is limited to non-privileged primitives and we thus do not discuss privileges further. We
refer the interested reader to the library documentation for details on privileges.
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LIO computations LIO is a language-based floating-label system, inspired by IFC operating systems,
including HiStar (Zeldovich et al., 2006) and Asbestos (Efstathopoulos et al., 2005). In a floating-label
system, the label of a computation can rise to accommodate reading sensitive data, similar to the program
counter of more traditional language-based systems (Sabelfeld & Myers, 2003). Specifically, in LIO, a
computation C with label LC wishing to observe an object (e.g., a review) labeled LR can do so by first
raising its label to the join of the labels: LC ⊔LR. Consider, for example, a simple λ Chair review system
computation that retrieves the content of a review, and writes it to an output channel.
readReview R = do -- Initial computation label: LC
rv ← retrieveReview R -- Computation label when retrieving: LC ⊔LR
printLabeledCh rv -- Computation label when printing: LC ⊔LR
Here, we assume that the computation is executing on behalf of a user, Clarice, with initial label LC and
that review R has label LR. The computation label is shown in the comments as the different actions are
executed. Internally, the retrieveReview function is used to retrieve the review contents rv; the function
raises the computation label to LC ⊔ LR to reflect the observation of sensitive review information. This
directly highlights the notion of a “floating-label”: a computation’s label effectively “floats above” the
labels of all objects it observes.
The floating label is used to restrict writes: a computation cannot write to an entity whose label is below
the computation label. In the example, the action printLabeledCh rv, which performs a write, does not
change the computation label. However, printLabeledCh returns an action that writes the review content
rv to standard output channel, labeled LO, only if LC ⊔LR ⊑ LO. In λ Chair, the standard output channel
label, LO, is dynamically set according to the user executing the computation; LO is set so as to allow for
printing out all but the conflicting reviews. Thus, if user Clarice has a conflict of interest with review R,
LO is set such that LR 6⊑ LO.
Unlike existing language-based IFC systems, LIO also associates a clearance with each computation.
This clearance sets an upper bound on the current floating label within some region of code. For example,
the notion of clearance can be used to prevent Clarice from retrieving (and not just printing) the contents
of a conflicting review R by setting the computation’s clearance to CC such that LR 6⊑ CC. In general,
before raising the computation label, LIO combinators first check that the new label will not exceed the
computation clearance. Hence, when the action retrieveReview R attempts to raise the current label to
LC ⊔LR, the computation will fail since LC ⊔LR 6⊑CC.
More interestingly, clearance can be used to prevent malicious code from exploiting covert channels.
For example, without clearance, the following function can be used by a user, such as Clarice, to leak
information on reviews which she is in conflict with:
leakingRetriveReview r = do -- Initial label: LC
rv ← retrieveReview r -- Retrieving: LC ⊔LR (if LC ⊔LR ⊑CC)
covertChannel rv -- Leak review into covert channel
The function covertChannel leaks (part of) the sensitive review content into a covert channel, such as
the termination channel. In the latter case, the function leaks information by deciding whether or not to
diverge based on sensitive data. A simple example that leaks a bit is given below.
covertChannel rv =
if rv=="Paper..." -- If sensitive review matches "Paper..."
then forever (return rv) -- then loop forever
else return rv -- otherwise return
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Using clearance, we prevent such leaks by setting the clearance and review labels such that retrieveReview
fails when it attempts to raise the computation label to retrieve conflicting reviews (the additional check
LC ⊔LR ⊑CC will not hold).
2.1 Library Interface
LIO is a termination-insensitive and flow-sensitive (Askarov et al., 2008; Hunt & Sands, 2006) IFC li-
brary that dynamically enforces information flow restrictions. At a high level, LIO defines a monad called
LIO, intended to be used in place of IO. The library furthermore contains a collection of LIO actions, many
of them similar to IO actions from standard Haskell libraries, except that they contain label checks that
enforce IFC.
To implement the notion of floating label that is bounded by a clearance, our library defines LIO as a
state monad, parametric in the label type, and using IO as the underlying base monad. The state consists of
a current label Lcur, i.e., the computation’s floating label, and a current clearance Ccur, which is an upper
bound on Lcur, i.e., Lcur ⊑Ccur always holds. The (slightly simplified) LIO monad is defined as:
newtype LIO l a = LIOTCB (StateT (l, l) IO a)
where the state corresponds to the current label and clearance. To allow for the execution of LIO actions,
our library provides the function evalLIO that takes an LIO action and returns an IO action which, when
executed, will return the result of the IFC-respecting computation. It is important to note that untrusted
LIO code cannot execute IO computations by binding IO actions with LIO ones (to bypass IFC restrictions),
because LIOTCB is a private symbol. Effectively this limits evalLIO to trusted code. Additionally, using
evalLIO, trusted programmers can easily, though cautiously, enforce IFC in parts of an otherwise IFC-
unaware program.
The current label provides a means for associating a label with every piece of data. Hence, rather than
individually labeling definitions and bindings, all symbols in scope are protected by Lcur. Moreover, the
only way to read or modify differently labeled data is to execute (trusted) actions that internally access
restricted symbols and appropriately validate and adjust the current label (or clearance).
In many practical situations, it is essential to be able to manipulate differently-labeled data without
monotonically increasing the current label. For this purpose, the library additionally provides a Labeled
type for labeling values with labels other than Lcur. A Labeled, polymorphic in the label type, protects
an immutable value with a specified label irrespective of the current label. This is particularly useful
as it allows a computation to delay raising its current label until necessary. For example, an alternative
retrieveReview implementation can retrieve the review content, convert it to HTML, encapsulate the
markup into a Labeled value, and return the Labeled value while leaving the current label unchanged.
This approach delays the “creeping” of current label until the review content, as encapsulated by Labeled,
is actually needed.
We note that LIO can be used to protect pure values in a similar fashion to Labeled. However, the
protection provided by Labeled allows for serializing labeled values and straight forward inspection
by trusted code (which may ignore the protecting label). Unlike LIO, Labeled is not a monad1. The
monad instance would allow a computation to use bind and return to arbitrarily manipulate labeled
values without any notion of the current label or clearance, and thus (possibly) violate the restriction
1 In fact, Labeled cannot be a functor; this would violate non-interference when considering integrity into the
security labels.
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that LIO computations should not handle values below their current label or above their current clearance.
Moreover, the Monad instance would require a definition for a default label necessary when lifting a value
with return. Instead, our library provides several functions that allow for the creation and usage of labeled
values within LIO. Specifically, we provide (among other) the following functions:
◮ label :: Label l ⇒l →a →LIO l (Labeled l a)
Given a label l such that Lcur ⊑ l ⊑Ccur and a value v, the action label l v returns a labeled value that
protects v with l.
◮ unlabel :: Label l ⇒Labeled l a →LIO l a
Assuming that lv is associated to label l, the action unlabel lv raises the current label to Lcur ⊔ l if
Lcur⊔ l ⊑Ccur and returns the unlabeled value. Note that the new current label is at least as high as lv’s
label, preserving the confidentiality of the value.
◮ toLabeled :: Label l ⇒l →LIO l a →LIO l (Labeled l a)
Given a label l such that Lcur ⊑ l ⊑Ccur and an LIO action m, toLabeled l m executes m without raising
the current label. However, instead of returning the result directly, the function returns the result of m
encapsulated in a Labeled. The label of the labeled value is l; to preserve confidentiality (see Section 4
for further details), action m must not read any values with a label above l. In monadic terms, toLabeled
is an environment-oriented action that provides a different context for a temporary bind thread.
◮ labelOf :: Label l ⇒Labeled l a →l
If lv is a labeled value with label l and value v, labelOf lv returns l.
Our library additionally provides labeled alternatives to mutable references, i.e., IORefs. Specifically, we
provide labeled references LIORef l a that are created with newLIORef, read with readLIORef, and
written to with writeLIORef. When creating or writing to a reference with label LR, it must be the case
that Lcur ⊑ LR ⊑Ccur; when reading Lcur is raised to Lcur⊔LR, clearance permitting.
In the conference version of this work (Stefan et al., 2011b), the execution of programs stop when the
IFC constraints imposed by the ⊑-relationship are not fulfilled. Similar to other dynamic IFC approaches
(e.g., (Askarov & Sabelfeld, 2009; Russo & Sabelfeld, 2009; Austin & Flanagan, 2010)), this design de-
cision restricts the possibilities for programs to recover from failures. Later in this section, we show how
to extend LIO with exception handling so that programs can recover from failures or insecure actions
without compromising confidentiality or integrity of data.
The formal semantics for the functions described above are given in Section 4; in this section, we
illustrate their functionality and use through examples. Specifically, consider the previous example of
readReview. The internal function retrieveReview takes a review identifier R and returns the review con-
tents. Internally, retrieveReview must have access to a list of reviews, which are individually protected
by different labels. In this model, adding a new review to the system can be implemented as:
addReview R LR rv = do
r ← label LR rv -- Checks Lcur ⊑ LR ⊑Ccur
addToReviewList R r -- Appends labeled review to internal list
where the addToReviewList simply adds the Labeled review to the internal list. The implementation of
retrieveReview is similar:
retrieveReview R = do -- Initial label, Lcur = LC
r ← getFromReviewList R -- Retrieving a labeled result, Lcur = LC
rv ← unlabel r -- Unlabel result, raises label to Lcur = LC ⊔LR
return rv -- Returning unlabeled content, Lcur = LC ⊔LR
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where the getFromReviewList retrieves the Labeled review from the internal list and unlabel removes
the protecting label, raising the current label to reflect the observation.
We previously alluded to an alternative implementation of retrieveReview that returns the labeled,
review content in HTML form while keeping the current label the same. This implementation can be
directly leverage the above retrieveReview:
retrieveReviewHtml R = do -- Outer: Initial label, Lcur = LC
r ← toLabeled (LC ⊔LR) $ do -- Inner: Initial label, Lcur = LC
rv ← retrieveReview R -- Inner: Retrieve review, Lcur = LC ⊔LR
return (toHtml rv) -- Inner: Return review, Lcur = LC ⊔LR
return r -- Outer: Return labeled review, Lcur = LC
Note that although the current label within the inner computation is raised, the outer computation’s label
does not change—instead the marked-up review content is protected by the label LC ⊔LR. Hence, only
when the review content is actually needed, unlabel can be used to retrieve the content and raise the
computation’s label accordingly:
readReviewHtml R = do -- Initial label Lcur = LC
r ← retrieveReviewHtml R -- Retrieve labeled review, Lcur = LC
-- Perform other computations, such that Lcur = L′C
rv ← unlabel r -- Unlabel labeled review, Lcur = L′C ⊔LR
printLabeledCh rv -- Print review content, Lcur = L′C ⊔LR
2.1.1 Exception handling
Exception handling is common in real-world applications, and, as already noted, LIO provides support
for such constructs. Throwing an exception depends on the information present in the lexical scope.
Consequently, LIO labels an exception with the current label (Lcur) at the point where the exception is
thrown. Specifically, the primitive
throwLIO :: (Exception e) ⇒ e → LIO l a
takes an arbitrary exception and wraps it into a labeled exception type:
data LabeledException l e = ...
which itself is an instance of Exception. The label of the exception is set to the current label Lcur.
Conversely, the primitive:
catch :: (Exception e) ⇒ LIO l a → (e → LIO l a) → LIO l a
can be used to execute an LIO action, using an exception handler to address the case when the computation
raises an exception. Suppose the current label and clearance are Lcur and Ccur, respectively. Given a
computation m, and an exception handler he, catch m he executes m and then:
1. if no exception is thrown, the result produced by catch is simply the result of m, leaving the current
label and clearance unchanged (as of the execution of m).
2. if an exception with label l ⊑Ccur is thrown when executing m, the current label raised to Lcur⊔ l and
the exception handler is invoked (if the exception type matches). Raising the current label to Lcur⊔ l
before executing the exception handler indicates that the handler must not produce side-effects at
security levels lower than the one indicated by the label of the exception.
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3. if an exception with label l 6⊑Ccur is thrown, the exception label is raised to Lcur ⊔ l and re-thrown
(propagated to an outer catch).
It is worth remarking that primitive catch is the only means for inspecting information related to an
exception (e.g., kind of exception, security label, etc.).
Safe propagation of exceptions In LIO, the standard propagation of exceptions up the call stack until
reaching the nearest enclosing catch can be used to leak information. Consider the following function:
condThrow :: LIORef l Bool → LIO l ()
condThrow secRef = do
sec ← readLIORef secRef
if sec then throwLIO ... else return ()
Assuming that condThrow is invoked with the current label Lcur and secRef has label LR, throwLIO raises
an exception labeled Lcur ⊔ LR if the secret value stored in the reference is True. The exception label
indicates that the exception was raised after performing a secret read.
Although condThrow cannot directly be used to leak information, it is important to highlight that the
function throws an exception if the secret is True, and returns () otherwise. Hence, in the presence of
toLabeled, which restores the current label, it is important to reason about the propagation of excep-
tions. More specifically, if exceptions propagate until reaching the nearest enclosing catch, the following
function can be used to leak information:
leakIntoPub :: LIORef l Bool → LIORef l Bool → LIO l ()
leakIntoPub secRef pubRef = catch (
do writeLIORef pubRef True -- Write to public reference #1
_ ← toLabeled ⊤ $ condThrow secRef -- Throw exception if secret is True
writeLIORef pubRef False -- Write to public reference #2
) (λ_ → return ()) -- Handle exception
Suppose that the function is invoked with a current label Lcur =⊥ and current clearance Ccur =⊤, secRef
is labeled ⊤ and pubRef is labeled ⊥. Initially, the computation can directly read and write to pubRef, but
only read from secRef.
Note that catch is only used to force normal termination, i.e., execution of function leakIntoPub always
return (). More importantly, note that public side-effects are performed before (writeLIORef pubRef True)
and after (writeLIORef pubRef False) executing a computation on secret data (condThrow secRef).
(This is possible because the computation condThrow secRef is enclosed in a toLabeled block, and thus
the current label remains unchanged.) Moreover, if the value of the secret reference secRef is True, then
an exception is raised in condThrow and further propagated to the enclosing catch without executing
the second write to the public reference (writeLIORef pubRef False). Hence, if an exception is raised
in condThrow the content of pubRef remains True. In contrast, if no exception is thrown, the content of
pubRef is set to False: clearly, a direct leak of the value stored in secRef.
It is important to finally note that although catch will raise the current label when an exception raised
in the secret computation, leakIntoPub can also be enclosed by toLabeled:
leakSecretRef :: LIORef l Bool → LIO l Bool
leakSecretRef secRef = do
pubRef ← newLIORef ⊥ True -- Create public reference
toLabeled ⊤ $ leakIntoPub secRef pubRef -- Perform attack
readLIORef pubRef -- Read "secRef" value
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This function returns the content of the secret reference secRef without raising the current label.
Due to the feasibility of such attacks, LIO propagates exceptions up to the nearest catch or toLabeled.
Intuitively, the correct semantics of toLabeled are as before with the added requirement that all exceptions
be caught: regardless how the computation enclosed by toLabeled terminates, a Labeled value must
always be returned. Conceptually this is equivalent to labeling a lifted value, i.e., a value that may be a
“normal” value or an exception. Of course, if the result of unlabel is an exception, the exception will
propagate to the nearest catch or toLabeled.
Considering this modification to the semantics of toLabeled, observe that the side-effects in leakIntoPub
produced after the toLabeled block will always be executed (even if an exception is raised inside condThrow).
More generally, we close up leaks through exception propagation by simply assuring that the execution of
(possibly public) actions following a toLabeled block does not depend on the abnormal termination of a
computation inside toLabeled.
Recovery of unsafe actions Unlike other dynamic IFC approaches, such as (Askarov & Sabelfeld, 2009;
Sabelfeld & Russo, 2009; Austin & Flanagan, 2009; Austin & Flanagan, 2010; Devriese & Piessens, 2011)),
LIO allows untrusted programs to safely recover from failures due to IFC violation attempts (e.g., trying to
create labeled values below the current label, or read from a reference labeled above the current clearance,
etc.) Having a safe handling of exceptions in place, LIO raises a labeled exception when a security
constraint is not fulfilled. This allows untrusted code to catch exceptions and handle monitor failures
gracefully. Consider, for instance, the following function that unlabels a Labeled value and returns a
Maybe value to indicate the success of such operation:
safeUnlabel :: Labeled a → LIO l (Maybe a)
safeUnlabel lv = catch ( do v ← unlabel lv -- Fails if labelOf lv 6⊑Ccur
return (Just v)
) (λ_ → return Nothing)
If the label of lv is above the current clearance, the LIO primitive unlabel throws an exception. In this
example, however, this exception is caught (since the label of the exception will be Lcur and the exception
handler will simply return Nothing). If the label of lv is below the clearance, the current label is raised
and the unlabeled result is simply returned.
3 λ Chair
To demonstrate the flexibility of our dynamic information flow library, we present λ Chair, a simple API
(built on the examples of Section 2) for implementing secure conference reviewing systems. In general,
a conference reviewing system should support various features (and security policies) that a program
committee can use in the review process. Minimally, it should support:
◮ Paper submission: ability to add new papers to the system.
◮ User creation: ability to dynamically add new reviewers.
◮ User login: a means for authenticating users.
◮ Review delegation: ability to assign reviewers to papers.
◮ Paper reading: means for reading papers.
◮ Review writing: means for writing reviews.
◮ Review reading: means for reading reviews.
◮ Conflict establishment: ability to restrict specific users from reading conflicting reviews.
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Even for such a minimal system, a number of security concerns must be addressed. First, only users
assigned to a paper may write the corresponding reviews. Second, information from the review of one
paper should not leak into a different paper’s review. And, third, users should not receive any information
on the reviews of the papers with which they are in conflict.
λ Chair’s API provides the aforementioned security policies by applying information flow control.
Following the examples of Section 2, we take the approach of enforcing IFC when writing to output
channels, and thus the security for the above policies correspond to that of non-interference, i.e., secret
data is not leaked into less secret channels/reviews. The alternative, clearance-restricting approach of
Section 2 can be used to enforce the security policies by confinement rather than non-interference (see
Section 5). Before delving into the details of the λ Chair, we first introduce the specific label format used
in the implementation.
3.1 DC Labels
λ Chair is implemented using Disjunction-Category (DC) labels (Stefan et al., 2011a). DC labels can be
used to express a conjunction of restrictions on information flow that represents the interests of multiple
stake-holders. As a result, DC labels are especially suitable for systems in which participating parties do
not fully trust each other, e.g., a conference review system.
Policies are expressed by leveraging the notions of principals. In our system, a principal is a string that
represents a source of authority such as a user, group, role, etc. A DC label, written 〈S, I〉, consists of two
Boolean formulas S and I over principals. Both components S and I are minimal formulas in conjunctive
normal form (CNF), with positive terms and clauses sorted to give each formula a unique representation.
Component S protects secrecy by specifying the principals that are allowed (or whose consent is needed)
to observe the data. Dually, I protects integrity by specifying principals who created, vouches for, and
may currently modify the data.
Data may flow between differently labeled entities, but only in such a way as to accumulate additional
secrecy restrictions or be stripped in integrity ones, not vice versa. Specifically, the ⊑-relation for DC
labels is defined as:
Definition 1 (DC label ⊑ relation)
For any two DC labels 〈S1, I1〉 and 〈S2, I2〉,
S2 =⇒ S1 I1 =⇒ I2
〈S1, I1〉 ⊑ 〈S2, I2〉
In other words, data labeled 〈S1, I1〉 can flow to an entity labeled 〈S2, I2〉 if and only if the secrecy of the
data, and integrity of the entity are preserved. Intuitively, the ⊑ relation imposes the restriction that any
set of principals who can observe data afterwards must also have been able to observe it earlier. Dually,
the integrity of the entity is preserved by requiring that the source label impose more restrictions than that
of the destination.
The join and meet for DC labels directly follows from the definition. The join and meet of any two
DC labels L1 = 〈S1, I1〉 and L2 = 〈S2, I2〉 are respectively: L1 ⊔ L2 = 〈S1∧S2, I1∨ I2〉 and L1 ⊓ L2 =
〈S1∨S2, I1∧ I2〉, where each component of the resulting labels is reduced to CNF.
Intuitively, the secrecy component of the join protects the secrecy of L1 and L2 by specifying that
both set of principals, those appearing in S1 and those in S2, must consent for data labeled S1∧ S2 to be
observed. Conversely, the integrity component of the join, I1∨ I2, specifies that either principals of I1 or
I2 could have created and modify the data. Dual properties hold for the meet L1⊓L2.
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We note that our implementation of DC labels forms a bounded lattice. The least restrictive component
corresponds to the Boolean value True; the most restrictive component corresponds to the Boolean value
False. These interpretations allow for a sound definition of the top ⊤ and bottom ⊥ elements for the DC
label lattice: ⊤ = 〈False,True〉, and ⊥ = 〈True,False〉. Additionally, in our model, public entities have
the default, or empty label, Lpub = 〈True,True〉. It is intuitive that data labeled 〈S, I〉 can be written to
a public network with label Lpub, only with the permission of a set of principals satisfying the Boolean
formula S. Conversely, data read from the network can be labeled 〈S, I〉 only with the permission of a set
of principals satisfying I.
3.2 DC Labels in λ Chair
We now describe the data structures and the role of DC labels (from now on just labels) in λ Chair.
Intuitively, the λ Chair API provides administrators and reviewers with functions for querying review
entries and modifying user accounts. Hence, λ Chair is implemented as a state monad RevLIO (whose
value constrctor RevLIOTCB is not exported to untrusted code) that stores information on reviews and
users, with LIO as the underlying monad.
The λ Chairsystem relies on two principal types corresponding to papers and reviews. We identify
papers and reviews according to the unique paper identifier/number. As such, for the ith paper the principal
associated with the paper is Pi, while the principal associated with the corresponding review is Ri.
Review entries A review entry is defined as a record consisting of a paper number, a reference to the
corresponding paper, and a reference to the shared review ‘notebook’. For simplicity, all reviewers append
their review to the same review notebook. The type for such entries is:
data ReviewEnt = ReviewEnt { paperId :: Id -- Paper number
, paper :: DCRef Paper -- Paper content
, review :: DCRef Review } -- Notebook
where DCRef is a labeled reference using DC labels, i.e., type DCRef = LIORef DCLabel. Note that this
differs from the examples of Section 2, where the reviews were simply Labeled values.
Users A reviewer, or user, has a unique user name, password, and two disjoint sets of paper ids (in our
implementation these are simple lists). One set corresponds to the user’s conflicting papers, the second set
corresponds to the papers the user has been assigned to review. Concretely, we define a user as value of
type:
data User = User { name :: Name -- User name
, password :: Password -- Password
, conflicts :: [Id] -- Conflicting papers
, assignments :: [Id] } -- Paper assigned to review
A user is authenticated given a user name and password as credentials. Following authentication, the
code of the reviewer, who is assigned to papers 1, . . . ,n, is executed with the current label initially set
to 〈True, R1∧·· ·∧Rn〉, where Ri is the principal corresponding to review entry i. The current clearance
is set to ⊤ = 〈False, True〉. The secrecy component in the clearance allows the executing code to read
any data; the integrity component of the current label allow the process to only write to assigned reviews
(detailed below).
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Reading and writing papers After logging in, users are allowed to read and print out any paper by
supplying the paper id. The label of the reference paper in the ith review entry is set to 〈True, Pi〉.
The secrecy component does not restrict any computation from observing the paper by reading the
reference content (the paper). However, the integrity component restricts the modification of the ith paper
to computations that own principal Pi and can therefore run with Pi in the integrity component of its current
label. Only a trusted administrator and the paper submission code is allowed to own such principals. As a
consequence, computations executing on behalf of a reviewer cannot modify the paper since the current
label assigned by the trusted login procedure never includes Pi in its integrity component.
Reading and writing reviews A reviewer’s code is also allowed to access the review notebook content
of arbitrary review entries. Once a review has been read, however, its content must not be leaked into
another paper’s review notebook. We fulfill this requirement by identifying, using labels, when a given
piece of code reads a certain review. Concretely, we label the reference review of the ith review entry as
〈Ri, Ri〉. As a consequence, when a computation wishes to read the review for entry i, it must raise2 it
current label so as to include the principal Ri in its components (clearance permitted). Once a computation
has been tainted as such, it will not be able to modify the contents of another paper’s review. Such tainted
computations will have a label with principal Ri in the secrecy component (as a conjunction) and integrity
component (as a disjunction). Consider, for instance, a computation performing a review of paper i such
that the current label is Li = 〈Ri, Ri〉. If the computation subsequently reads a different review labeled
L j =
〈
R j, R j
〉
, the current label is set to L =
〈
Ri∧R j, Ri∨R j
〉
. To write to the either review i or j it
must be that the current label flows to the review labels, i.e., L ⊑ Li or L ⊑ L j . It is clear that neither flow
restrictions are satisfied, and thus such illegal writes are prevented.
Conflicts Following the readReview examples of Section 2, we restrict the reading, or more specifically,
printing of a review by those reviewers in conflict with the paper. Although every user is allowed to
retrieve a review, they cannot observe the result unless they write it to an output channel. Hence, code
running on behalf of a user (determined after logging in) can only write to the output channel (using
printLabelCh) if the current label L can flow to the output channel label Lo. Using the set of conflicting
paper ids, for every user, we dynamically assign the output channel label Lo = 〈So, True〉, where So =
R1∧·· · ∧Rn∧ (Rn+1 ∨#CONFLICT)∧·· · ∧ (RN ∨#CONFLICT) and Ri, i = n+ 1, . . . ,N are the principals
corresponding to all the review entries in the system (at the point of the print) that the authenticated user is
in conflict with. Here, #CONFLICT corresponds to a principal that none of the users own (similar to Pi used
in the labels of paper references). For each conflicting paper i, we use the disjunction Ri ∨ #CONFLICT
in the channel secrecy component to guarantee that a computation tainted with Ri cannot write to the
channel. Suppose a computation running on behalf of a reviewer in conflict with the ith paper reads
review Ri. In this situation, the current label is set to L = 〈Ri∧·· · , · · ·〉. Subsequent attempts to write to
the output channel will be disallowed since L 6⊑ Lo. For L ⊑ Lo to hold, there must be a clause in Lo that
implies Ri. However, when in conflict, the only clause in the secrecy component that contains Ri in the
Ri∨#CONFLICT (and clearly Ri∨#CONFLICT =⇒ Ri does not hold).
2 We loosely use the term “raise” to mean moving up the security lattice – this implies more secret, and of lower
integrity in the DC label lattice.
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3.3 Implementation
Having established the underlying data structures and labeling patterns, we present the λ Chair API. As the
main goal of λ Chair is to demonstrate the flexibility and power of our dynamic information flow library,
we do not extend our example to a full-fledged system; the API can, however, be used to build relatively
complex review systems. Below, we present the details of the λ Chair functions, which return actions in the
RevLIO monad. As previously noted, this monad is a state monad with LIO as the base monad, threading
the system users, review entries, and name of the current user through the computation.
System administrator interface A λ Chair administrator is provided with several functions that dynam-
ically change the system state. From these functions, we detail the most interesting cases below.
◮ addPaper :: Paper →RevLIO Id
Given a paper, it creates a new review entry for the paper and return the paper id. Internally, addPaper
uses a function similar to addReview of Section 2.
◮ addUser :: Name →Password →RevLIO ()
Given a unique user name and password, it adds the new user.
◮ addAssignment :: Name →Id →RevLIO ()
Given a user name and paper id, it assigns the user to review the corresponding paper. The user must
not be already in conflict with the paper.
◮ addConflict :: Name →Id →RevLIO ()
Given a user name and paper id, it marks the user as being in conflict with the paper. As above, it must
be the case that the user is not already assigned to review the paper.
◮ asUser :: Name →RevLIO () →RevLIO ()
Given a user name, and user-constructed piece of code, it first authenticates the user and then executes
the provided code with the current label and clearance of the user as described in Section 3.2. After the
code is executed, the current label and clearance are restored and any information flow violations are
reported.
Reviewer interface The reviewer, or user, composes an untrusted RevLIO computation (or action) that
the trusted code executes using asUser. Such actions may be composed using the following interface:
◮ findPaper :: String →RevLIO Id
Given a paper title, it returns its paper id, or fails if the paper is not found.
◮ readPaper :: Id →RevLIO Paper
Given a paper id, the function returns an action which, when executed, returns the paper content.
◮ readReview :: Id →RevLIO ()
Given a paper id, the function returns an action which, when executed, prints the review to the standard
output. Its implementation is similar to the example of Section 2, except that it operates on references.
◮ appendToReview :: Id→Content→RevLIO ()
Given a paper id and a review content, the function returns an action which, when executed, appends the
supplied content to the review entry. Since there is no direct observation of the current review content,
and to avoid label creep, the function, internally, uses toLabeled.
Figure 1 shows a simple example using the λ Chair API. In this example, Alice is assigned to review
two papers. She does so by reading each paper (for the second, she also reads the existing reviews) and
appending to the review “notebook”. Bob, on the other hand, is added to the system after Alice’s code is
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module Admin where
import Alice
import Bob
main = evalRevLIO $ do
-- Adding users to system
addUser "Alice" "password"
-- Adding papers to system
p1 ← addPaper "Flexible Dynamic..."
p2 ← addPaper "A Static..."
-- Assign reviewers
addAssignment "Alice" p1
addAssignment "Alice" p2
-- Executing Alice’s code
asUser "Alice" $ aliceCode
-- Adding new users to system
addUser "Bob" "password"
-- Assign reviewers and conflicts
addAssignment "Bob" p2
addConflict "Bob" p1
-- Executing Bob’s code
asUser "Bob" $ bobCode
module Alice where
aliceCode = do
p1 ← findPaper "Flexible Dynamic..."
p2 ← findPaper "A Static..."
readPaper p1
appendToReview p1 "Interesting work!"
readPaper p2
readReview p2
appendToReview p2 "What about adding
new users?"
return ()
module Bob where
bobCode = do
p1 ← findPaper "Flexible Dynamic..."
p2 ← findPaper "A Static..."
appendToReview p2 "Hmm, IFC.."
readReview p1 -- IFC violation attempt
-- (exception raised)
return ()
Fig. 1: An example of code using λ Chair API.
executed. Bob first writes a review for the second paper and then attempts to violate IFC by trying to read
(and write to the output channel) the reviews of the first paper. Though his review is appended to the correct
paper, reading the review of the first paper is suppressed. Of course, the IFC violation attempt results in
an exception. Though in this case Bob does not catch the exception, and the exception is propagated to the
trusted API call asUser which handles the exceptions. Note, however, that Bob can safely recover from
such IFC violation attempts. More specifically, the line readReview p1 can be replaced by:
catch (readReview p1)
(λ_ → writeToBobsLog "In conflict!" )
In this case, Bob’s computation will terminate gracefully and simply write to log when he attempts to read
the first paper’s review.
4 Formal Semantics for LIO
This section formalizes our library for a call-by-name λ -calculus extended with Booleans, unit values,
pairs, recursion, references, exceptions, and the LIO monadic operations. Figure 1 provides the formal
syntax of the considered language. Syntactic categories v, e, and τ represent values, expressions, and types,
respectively. Values are side-effect free while expressions denote (possible) side-effecting computations.
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Figure 1 Formal syntax for values, expressions, and types.
Value: v ::= true | false | () | l | a | X | x | λ x.e | (e,e)
| fix e | Lb v e | (e)LIO | Xl | •
Expression: e ::= v | e e | pii e | if e then e else e
| let x = e in e | return e | e >>= e
| label e e | unlabel e | toLabeled e e
| newLIORef e e | readLIORef e | writeLIORef e e
| throwLIO e | catch e e
| lowerClr e | getLabel | getClearance
| labelOf e | labelOfRef e
Type: τ ::= Bool | () | τ → τ | (τ,τ) | ℓ
| Labeled ℓ τ | LIO ℓ τ | Ref ℓ τ | X
Store: φ :Address→ Labeled ℓ τ
Values In the syntax category v, symbol true and false represent Boolean values. Symbol () represents
the unit value. Symbol l denotes security labels. Symbol a represents memory addresses in a given
store. Symbol X represents exceptions. Values include variables (x), functions (λ x.e), tuples (e,e), and
recursive functions (fix e). Four special syntax nodes are added to this category: Lb v e, (e)LIO, Xl , and
•. Node Lb v e denotes the run-time representation of a labeled value. Node (e)LIO denotes the run-time
representation of a monadic LIO computation. Similarly node Xl denotes the run-time representation of a
labeled exception. Node • represents an erased value (explained in Section 5). We note that none of these
special nodes appear in programs written by users and they are merely introduced for technical reasons.
Expressions Expressions are composed of values (v), function applications (e e), pair projections (pii e),
conditional branches (if e then e else e), and local definitions (let x = e in e). Additionally, ex-
pressions may involve operations related to monadic computations in the LIO monad. More precisely,
return e and e >>= e represent the monadic return and bind operations. Monadic operations related to
the manipulation of labeled values inside the LIO monad are given by label, unlabel, and toLabeled.
Expression label e1 e2 creates a labeled value that guards e2 with label e1. Expression unlabel e ac-
quires the content of the labeled value e while in a LIO computation. Expression toLabeled e1 e2 creates
a labeled value, with label e1, of the result obtained by evaluating the LIO computation e2. Non-proper
morphisms related to creating, reading, and writing of references are respectively captured by expressions
newLIORef, readLIORef, and writeLIORef. LIO operations may raise exceptions by calling throwLIO
and catch exceptions with catch. Expression lowerClr e allows lowering of the current clearance to
e. Expressions getLabel and getClearance return the current label and current clearance of an LIO
computation, respectively. Finally, expressions labelOf e and labelOfRef e respectively obtain the
security label of labeled values and references.
Types We consider standard types for Booleans (Bool), unit (()), pairs (τ,τ), and function (τ → τ)
values. Type ℓ describes security labels. Type Labeled ℓ τ describes labeled values of type τ , where the
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Figure 2 Operational semantics for LIO (part I).
E ::= · · · | return E | E >>= e | labelOf E | labelOfRef E
(RETURN)
〈Σ,E[return v]〉 −→ 〈Σ,E[(v)LIO]〉
(BIND-1)
〈Σ,E[(Xl)LIO >>= e]〉 −→ 〈Σ,E[(Xl)LIO]〉
(BIND-2)
v 6= Xl
〈Σ,E[(v)LIO >>= e]〉 −→ 〈Σ,E[e v]〉
(CLAB)
l = Σ.lbl
〈Σ,E[getLabel]〉 −→ 〈Σ,E[return l]〉
(CCLR)
l = Σ.clr
〈Σ,E[getClearance]〉 −→ 〈Σ,E[return l]〉
(GLAB)
〈Σ,E[labelOf (Lb l e)]〉 −→ 〈Σ,E[l]〉
(GLABR)
e = Σ.φ(a)
〈Σ,E[labelOfRef a]〉 −→ 〈Σ,E[labelOf e]〉
label is of type ℓ. Type LIO ℓ τ represents monadic LIO computations, with a result type τ and the security
labels of type ℓ. Type Ref ℓ τ describes labeled references, with labels of type ℓ, to values of type τ . Type
X describes unlabeled exceptions3.
4.1 Dynamic semantics for LIO
The LIO monad presented in Section 2 is implemented as a state monad. Without loss of generality, we
simplify the formalization and description of expressions by making the state of the monad part of a
run-time environment. More precisely, for a given LIO computation, the symbol Σ denotes a run-time
environment that contains the current label, written Σ.lbl, the current clearance, written Σ.clr, and store,
written Σ.φ . We represent the store as a mapping from memory addresses (a) into labeled values (Lb l e).
A run-time environment Σ and LIO computation form a configuration 〈Σ,e〉. Given a configuration 〈Σ,e〉,
the current label, clearance, and store when starting evaluation e is given by Σ.lbl, Σ.clr, and Σ.φ ,
respectively.
The relation 〈Σ,e〉 −→ 〈Σ′,e′〉 represents a single evaluation step from expression e, under the run-time
environment Σ, to expression e′ and run-time environment Σ′—we say that e reduces to e′ in one step. We
write −→∗ for the reflexive and transitive closure of −→. The evaluation relation is defined in terms of a
structured operational semantics via evaluation contexts (Felleisen, 1988).
The reduction rules for standard λ -calculus are self-explanatory and presented in Appendix A. More
interestingly, Figures 2 and 3 present the non-standard evaluation contexts and reduction rules for our
language. These rules guarantee that programs written using our approach fulfill non-interference, i.e.,
confidential information is not leaked, and confinement, i.e., a computation cannot access data above its
clearance.
3 For simplicity, we assume the set of exceptions is limited to a single type.
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Figure 3 Operational semantics for LIO (part II).
E ::= · · · | label E e | unlabel E | toLabeled E e | newLIORef E e
| readLIORef E | writeLIORef E e | throwLIO E | catch E e | lowerClr E
(LAB)
Σ.lbl⊑ l ⊑ Σ.clr
〈Σ,E[label l e]〉 −→ 〈Σ,E[return (Lb l e)]〉
(UNLAB)
l′ = Σ.lbl⊔ l l′ ⊑ Σ.clr Σ′ = Σ[lbl 7→ l′]
〈Σ,E[unlabel (Lb l e)]〉 −→ 〈Σ′,E[return e]〉
(TOLAB-1)
Σ.lbl⊑ l ⊑ Σ.clr
〈Σ,e〉 −→∗ 〈Σ′,(v)LIO〉 Σ′.lbl⊑ l Σ′′ = Σ′[lbl 7→ Σ.lbl,clr 7→ Σ.clr]
〈Σ,E[toLabeled l e]〉 −→ 〈Σ′′,E[label l v]〉
(TOLAB-2)
Σ.lbl⊑ l ⊑ Σ.clr
〈Σ,e〉 −→∗ 〈Σ′,(v)LIO〉 Σ′.lbl 6⊑ l Σ′′ = Σ′[lbl 7→ Σ.lbl,clr 7→ Σ.clr] l′′ = l⊔Σ′.lbl
〈Σ,E[toLabeled l e]〉 −→ 〈Σ′′,E[label l X ′l′′ ]〉
(NREF)
Σ.lbl⊑ l ⊑ Σ.clr Σ′ = Σ.φ [a 7→ Lb l e]
〈Σ,E[newLIORef l e]〉 −→ 〈Σ′,E[return a]〉
a fresh
(RREF)
Σ.φ(a) = Lb l e l′ = Σ.lbl⊔ l l′ ⊑ Σ.clr Σ′ = Σ[lbl 7→ l′]
〈Σ,E[readLIORef a]〉 −→ 〈Σ′,E[return e]〉
(WREF)
Σ.φ(a) = Lb l e Σ.lbl⊑ l ⊑ Σ.clr Σ′ = Σ.φ [a 7→ Lb l e′]
〈Σ,E[writeLIORef a e′]〉 −→ 〈Σ′,E[return ()]〉
(THROW)
l = Σ.lbl
〈Σ,E[throwLIO X ]〉 −→ 〈Σ,E[(Xl)LIO]〉
(CATCH-1)
l′ = Σ.lbl⊔ l l′ ⊑ Σ.clr Σ′ = Σ[lbl 7→ l′]
〈Σ,E[catch (Xl)LIO e]〉 −→ 〈Σ′,E[e X ]〉
(CATCH-2)
v 6= Xl
〈Σ,E[catch (v)LIO e]〉 −→ 〈Σ,E[(v)LIO]〉
(LWCLR)
Σ.lbl⊑ l ⊑ Σ.clr Σ′ = Σ[clr 7→ l]
〈Σ,E[lowerClr l]〉 −→ 〈Σ′,E[return ()]〉
Rules in Figure 2 are self-explanatory, e.g., the evaluation rules for return and (>>=) are standard and
labeled exceptions are propagated by (>>=) (rule (BIND-1)). Rule (LAB) of Figure 3 generates a labeled
value if and only if the label is between the current label and clearance of the LIO computation. Rule
(UNLAB) provides a method for accessing the content e of a labeled value Lb l e in LIO computations.
When the content of a labeled value is retrieved and used in an LIO computation, the current label is raised
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(Σ′ = Σ[lbl 7→ l′], where l′ = Σ.lbl⊔ l), capturing the fact that the remaining computation might depend
on e. Of course, the current label should not exceed clearance (l′ ⊑ Σ.clr).
The reduction of toLabeled deserves some attention. Expression toLabeled l e is used to execute a
computation e to completion4 (〈Σ,e〉 −→∗ 〈Σ′,(v)LIO〉) and wrap the result v into a labeled value whose
label is l. Specifying label l is the responsibility of the programmer. We note, however, that the label
l needs to be an upper bound on the current label for the evaluation of computation e (Σ′.lbl ⊑ l), a
restriction imposed in (TOLAB-1). The reason for this is due to the fact that security labels are protected
by the current label, effectively making them public information accessible to any computation within
scope (see rules (GLAB) and (GLABR)). As a consequence, a toLabeled that does not impose an upper
bound on the sensitivity of the data observed by e is susceptible to attacks. To illustrate this point, consider
a computation with current label is l0, that takes two (confidential) labeled values with respective labels
l1 and l2 such that li 6⊑ l0, i = 1,2. (Recall that the current label and clearance of a given LIO computation
can be changed dynamically.) Further, suppose that toLabeled does not take an upper-bound on the
computation’s observations. Directly, the following program can be used to leak sensitive information:
leak lV1 lV2 = do -- Initial label Lcur = l0
lV3 ← toLabeled $ do -- Label of lV3 may be:
v1 ← unlabel lV1 -- Read first value, raise label to Lcur = l1
if v1 then return True -- If value is, leave current label Lcur = l1
else unlabel lV2 -- Otherwise, the current label to Lcur = l2
return (labelOf lV3) -- Can be l1 or l2
Note that, if the returned value of the inner computation can have the label l1 or l2 (remember that
labels are effectively public information), information is directly leaked! Hence, to prevent such leaks,
programmers must provide an upper-bound on the current label obtained when e finishes computing.
Since our approach is dynamic, flow-sensitive, and sound, this may require non-trivial static analysis in
order to automatically determine the label for each call of toLabeled (Russo & Sabelfeld, 2010).
However, if the inner computation does read data more sensitive than l, such that the end current label
Σ′.lbl 6⊑ l, rule (TOLAB-2) specifies that an exception labeled with the join of the upper-bound l and Σ′
must be raised when performing an unlabel—hence, we return a labeled value that encloses an exception.
Note that an exception is not raised at the point of evaluating toLabeled, but rather when the labeled
value is unlabeled, and the current label is raised (see (UNLAB)).
When creating a reference, newLIORef l e produces a labeled value that guards e with label l and
stores it in the memory store (Σ′ = Σ.φ [a 7→ Lb l e]). The result of this operation is the memory address a
(return a). Observe that references are created only if the reference’s label (l) is between the current label
and clearance label (Σ.lbl ⊑ l ⊑ Σ.clr). As in (LAB), the restriction l ⊑ Σ.clr assures that programs
cannot manipulate or access data beyond their clearance. Section 5 further details such confinement
guarantees. Rule (RREF) obtains the content e of a labeled value Lb l e stored in at address a. This rule
raises the current label to the security level l′ (Σ′ = Σ[lbl 7→ l′] where l′ = Σ.lbl⊔ l). As in the previous
rule, (RREF) enforces that the result of reading a reference is below the clearance (l′⊑Σ.clr). Finally, rule
(WREF) updates the memory store with a new value for the reference (Σ′= Σ.φ [a 7→ Lb l e′]) as long as the
label of the reference is above the current label and it does not exceed the clearance (Σ.lbl⊑ l ⊑ Σ.clr).
4 By using big-step semantics instead of an evaluation context of the form toLabeled l E, the rules do not need
to rely on the use of trusted primitives or a stack for (saving and) restoring the current label and clearance when
executing toLabeled.
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If considering Σ.lbl as a dynamic version of the pc the restriction that the label of the reference must be
above the current label (Σ.lbl⊑ l) is similar to the one imposed by (Pottier & Simonet, 2002).
Throwing and catching exceptions is standard. An LIO computation may raise an exception according
to rule (THROW). The label of the raised exception is set to the current label. To handle exceptions raised
in a computation e1, a computation can execute the computation as catch e1 e2, where e2 corresponds
to the exception handler. If no exception is raised, then rule (CATCH-2) simply propagates the value.
However, if an exception is raised, and according to rule (CATCH-1), the current label is raised (clearance
permitting) to the label of the exception and the exception handler is applied to the unlabeled exception.
It is important to note that although our formalization of exceptions is limited to a single type, exceptions
in LIO can encode information, similar to our encoding of the current label at the point of the throw.
Rule (LWCLR) allows a computation to lower the current clearance to l. This operation is particularly
useful when trying to contain the access to some data as well as the effects produced by computations
executed by toLabeled. Rules (CLAB) and (CCLR) obtain the current label and clearance from the run-
time environment. Finally, rules (GLAB) and (GLABR) return the labels of labeled values and references.
Observe that, regardless of the current label and clearance of the run-time environment, these two rules
always succeed—hence “labels are public”.
Addressing IFC violation attempts Most of the evaluation rules in Figure 3 have a premise that imposes
an information flow restriction. For example, rule (LAB) imposes the restriction that no labeled values may
be labeled with a label below the current label or above the current clearance. As previously mentioned,
rather than imposing that the evaluation of a misbehaving program gets “stuck”, we allow untrusted code
to recover by throwing a monitor exception. Specifically, we introduce a “violation rule” for each rule
that consists on the rule’s premise being negated and always evaluating to a throwLIO. For example, the
violation rule for rule (LAB) is given by:
(¬LAB)
¬(Σ.lbl⊑ l ⊑ Σ.clr)
〈Σ,E[label l e]〉 −→ 〈Σ,E[throwLIO X ]〉
The remaining rules are similar and omitted for brevity.
4.2 Static semantics for LIO
Figure 4 shows the typing rules for a subset of the terms and expressions; the remaining rules are shown
in Appendix A. The typing rules are standard and we therefore do not describe them further. We note,
however, that, unlike previous work (Russo et al., 2008; Devriese & Piessens, 2011), we do not require
the use of any sophisticated features from Haskell’s type-system, a direct consequence of our dynamic
approach.
5 Soundness
In this section we show that LIO computations satisfy two security policies: non-interference and confine-
ment. Non-interference shows that secrets are not leaked, while confinement establishes that certain pieces
of code cannot manipulate or have access to certain data. The latter policy is similar to the confinement
policies presented in (Leroy & Rouaix, 1998; Banerjee & Naumann, 2005).
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Figure 4 Typing rules for subset of terms and expressions.
⊢ l : ℓ
Γ(a) = Labeled ℓ τ
Γ ⊢ a : Ref ℓ τ
Γ ⊢ X : X
Γ ⊢ e1 : ℓ Γ ⊢ e2 : τ
Γ ⊢ Lb e1 e2 : Labeled ℓ τ
Γ ⊢ e : τ
Γ ⊢ (e)LIO : LIO ℓ τ
Γ ⊢ e : ℓ Γ ⊢ X : X
Γ ⊢ Xe : τ
Γ ⊢ • : τ
Γ ⊢ e1 : ℓ Γ ⊢ e2 : τ
Γ ⊢ label e1 e2 : LIO ℓ (Labeled ℓ τ)
Γ ⊢ e : Labeled ℓ τ
Γ ⊢ unlabel e : LIO ℓ τ
Γ ⊢ e1 : ℓ Γ ⊢ e2 : LIO ℓ τ
Γ ⊢ toLabeled e1 e2 : LIO ℓ (Labeled ℓ τ)
Γ ⊢ e1 : ℓ Γ ⊢ e2 : τ
Γ ⊢ newLIORef e1 e2 : LIO ℓ (Ref ℓ τ)
Γ ⊢ e : Ref ℓ τ
Γ ⊢ readLIORef e : LIO ℓ τ
Γ ⊢ e1 : Ref ℓ τ Γ ⊢ e2 : τ
Γ ⊢ writeLIORef e1 e2 : LIO ℓ ()
Γ ⊢ e : X
Γ ⊢ throwLIO e : LIO ℓ τ
Γ ⊢ e1 : LIO ℓ τ Γ ⊢ e2 : X → LIO ℓ τ
Γ ⊢ catch e1 e2 : LIO ℓ τ
Γ ⊢ e : ℓ
Γ ⊢ lowerClr e : LIO ℓ ()
⊢ getLabel : LIO ℓ ℓ
⊢ getClearance : LIO ℓ ℓ
Γ ⊢ e : Lb ℓ τ
Γ ⊢ labelOf e : ℓ
Γ ⊢ e : Ref ℓ τ
Γ ⊢ labelOfRef e : ℓ
5.1 Non-interference
As in (Li & Zdancewic, 2010; Russo et al., 2008), we prove the non-interference property by using the
technique of term erasure. Intuitively, data at security levels where the attacker cannot observe information
can be safely rewritten to the syntax node •. For the rest of the paper, we assume that the attacker can
observe data up to security level L. The syntactic term •, denoting an erased expression, may be associated
to any type (recall Figure 9). Function εL is responsible for performing the rewriting for data at security
level not lower than L. In most of the cases, the erasure function is simply applied homomorphically (e.g.,
εL(if E then e else e′) = if εL(E) then εL(e) else εL(e′)). In the case of data constructors, it is
simply the identity function. The definition of εL for expressions and evaluation contexts are shown in
Appendix B. Figure 5 shows the definition of εL for terms, configurations, and bind. The three interesting
cases for this function are when εL is applied to a labeled value, a given configuration, or bind. In such
cases, term erasing could indeed modify the behavior of the program. A labeled value is erased if the label
assigned to it is above5 L (εL(Lb l e) = Lb l •, if l 6⊑ L). Similarly, the computation performed in a certain
configuration is erased if the current label is above L (εL(〈Σ,e〉) = 〈εL(Σ),•〉 if Σ.lbl 6⊑ L). Finally, if εL
is applied to a bind-expression where the action evaluates to a labeled exception with label l and l 6⊑ L,
then the expression is fully erase to (•)LIO.
5 We loosely use the word “above” to mean 6⊑, since labels may not be comparable.
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Figure 5 Erasure function for terms, memory store, configurations and bind-expression.
εL(true) = true εL(false) = false εL(()) = () εL(l) = l εL(a) = a εL(x) = x
εL(λ x.e) = λ x.εL(e) εL((e,e)) = (εL(e),εL(e)) εL(fix e) = fix εL(e)
εL(Lb l e) =
{
Lb l • l 6⊑ L
Lb l εL(e) otherwise
εL((e)
LIO) = (εL(e))
LIO εL(•) = •
εL(Σ.φ) = {(x,εL(Σ.φ(x)) : x ∈ dom(Σ.φ)}
εL(Σ) = Σ[φ 7→ εL(Σ.φ)]
εL(〈Σ,e〉) =
{
〈εL(Σ),•〉 Σ.lbl 6⊑ L
〈εL(Σ),εL(e)〉 otherwise
εL(X) = X εL(Xl) =
{
• l 6⊑ L
Xl otherwise
εL(e1 >>= e2) =
{
(•)LIO e1 = (Xl)LIO and l 6⊑ L
εL(e1) >>= εL(e2) otherwise
Following the definition of the erasure function, we introduce a new evaluation relation−→L as follows:
Definition 2 (−→L)
〈Σ,e〉 −→ 〈Σ′,e′〉
〈Σ,e〉 −→L εL(〈Σ′,e′〉)
Expressions under this relationship are evaluated in the same way as before, with the exception that,
after one evaluation step, the erasure function is applied to the resulting configuration, i.e., run-time
environment and expression. In that manner, the relation −→L guarantees that confidential data, i.e., data
not below level L, is erased as soon as it is created. We write −→∗L for the reflexive and transitive closure
of −→L.
〈Σ,e〉 −−−−→∗ 〈Σ′,e′〉yεL yεL
εL(〈Σ,e〉) −−−−→∗L εL(〈Σ′,e′〉)
Fig. 6: Simulation between −→∗ and −→∗L.
Most results that prove non-interference pursue the
goal of establishing a relationship between−→∗ and−→∗L
through the erasure function, as highlighted in Figure 6.
Informally, the diagram establishes that erasing all secret
data, i.e., data not below L, and then taking evaluation
steps in −→L is the same as taking steps in −→ and then
erasing all the secret values in the resulting configuration.
Observe that if information from some level above L is
leaked by e, then erasing all secret data and then taking
evaluation steps in −→L might not be the same as taking
steps in −→ and then erasing all the secret values in the resulting configuration.
For simplicity, we assume that the address space of the memory store is split into different security
levels and that allocation is deterministic. In that manner, the address returned when creating a reference
with level l depends only on the references with level l already in the store. These assumptions are valid
in our language since, similar to traditional references in Haskell, we do not provide any mechanisms for
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deallocation or inspection of addresses in the API. However, when memory allocation is an observable
channel, the library could be adapted in order to deal with non-opaque pointers (Hedin & Sands, 2006).
We start by showing that the evaluation relationships −→ and −→L are deterministic. Firstly, however,
we note that e = e′ means syntactic equality between expressions e and e′ and equality between run-time
environments, written Σ = Σ′, is defined as the point-wise equality between mappings Σ and Σ′.
Proposition 1 (Determinacy of −→)
◮ For any expression e and run-time environment Σ such that 〈Σ,e〉 −→ 〈Σ′,e′′〉, there is a unique
term e′ and unique evaluation context E such that e = E[e′].
◮ If 〈Σ,e〉 −→ 〈Σ′,e′〉 and 〈Σ,e〉 −→ 〈Σ′′,e′′〉, then e′ = e′′ and Σ′ = Σ′′.
Proof
By induction on expressions and evaluation contexts.
Proposition 2 (Determinacy of −→L)
If 〈Σ,e〉 −→L 〈Σ′,e′〉 and 〈Σ,e〉 −→L 〈Σ′′,e′′〉, then e′ = e′′ and Σ′ = Σ′′.
Proof
From Proposition 1 and definition of εL.
The following proposition shows that the erasure function is homomorphic to the application of evalu-
ation contexts and substitution as well as that it is idempotent.
Proposition 3 (Properties of erasure function)
1. εL(E[e]) = εL(E)[εL(e)] 4. εL(εL(E)) = εL(E)
2. εL([e2/x]e1) = [εL(e2)/x]εL(e1) 5. εL(εL(Σ)) = εL(Σ)
3. εL(εL(e)) = εL(e) 6. εL(εL(〈Σ,e〉)) = εL(〈Σ,e〉)
Proof
Most cases follow by induction on expressions and evaluation contexts, see Appendix C for details.
The next lemma establishes a simulation between −→ and −→L for expressions that do not execute
toLabeled.
Lemma 1 (Single-step simulation without toLabeled )
If Γ ⊢ e : τ and 〈Σ,e〉 −→ 〈Σ′,e′〉 where toLabeled is not executed, then Γ ⊢ e′ : τ and εL(〈Σ,e〉) −→L
εL(〈Σ′,e′〉).
Proof
Part of the lemma shows subject reduction, which is proved by showing that a reduction step does not
change the types of references in the store Σ.φ and then applying induction on the typing derivations.
The simulation follows by induction on evaluation contexts and case analysis on terms and expressions.
Details are presented in Appendix C.
Using this lemma, we then show that the simulation is preserved when performing several evaluation
steps.
Lemma 2 (Simulation for expressions not executing toLabeled )
If Γ⊢ e : τ , 〈Σ,e〉−→∗ 〈Σ′,e′〉where there are no executions of toLabeled, then Γ⊢ e′ : τ and εL(〈Σ,e〉)−→∗L
εL(〈Σ′,e′〉).
Proof
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By induction on −→ and application of Lemma 1.
The reason for highlighting the distinction between expressions executing toLabeled and those not
executing it is due to the fact that the evaluation of toLabeled involves big-step semantics (recall rules
(TOLAB-1) and (TOLAB-2) in Figure 3). However, the next lemma shows the simulation between −→∗
and −→∗L for any expression e.
Lemma 3 (Simulation)
If Γ ⊢ e : τ and 〈Σ,e〉 −→∗ 〈Σ′,e′〉 then εL(〈Σ,e〉)−→∗L εL(〈Σ′,e′〉).
Proof
Lemma 2 shows the multi-step simulation for expressions that do not execute toLabeled. Thus, to show
the general multi-step simulation, we first prove that toLabeled preserves the simulation by induction
on the number of executed toLabeled. The general simulation follows directly. The interested reader is
referred to Appendix C.
Figure 7 L-equivalence for expressions.
e ≈L e
′ l ⊑ L
Lb l e ≈L Lb l e′
l 6⊑ L
Lb l e ≈L Lb l e′
We define L-equivalence between expressions. Intuitively, two expressions are L-equivalent if they are
syntactically equal, modulo labeled values whose labels do not flow to L. We use ≈L to represent L-
equivalence for expressions. Figure 7 shows the definition for labeled values. Considering the simple
lattice: L ⊑ M ⊑ H and an attacker at level L, it holds that Lb H 8 ≈L Lb H 9, but it does not hold that
Lb L 2 ≈L Lb L 3 or Lb H 8 ≈L Lb M 8. Recall that labels are protected by the current label, and thus
(usually) observable by an attacker — unlike the expressions they protect, labels must be the same even if
they are above L. The rest of≈L is defined as syntactic equality between constants (e.g., true≈L true) or
homomorphisms (e.g., if e then e1 else e2 ≈L if e′ then e′1 else e′2 if e≈L e′, e1 ≈L e′1, and e2 ≈L e′2).
Since our language encompasses side-effecting expressions, it is also necessary to define L-equivalence
between memory stores. Specifically, we say that two run-time environments are L-equivalent if an at-
tacker at level L cannot distinguish them:
Definition 3 (L-equivalence for stores)
l ⊑ L∨ l′ ⊑ L ∀a.Σ.φ(a) = Lb l e ≈L Σ′.φ(a) = Lb l′ e′
Σ.φ ≈L Σ′.φ
Note that the L-equivalence ignores the store references with labels above L. Similarly, we define L-
equivalence for configurations.
Definition 4 (L-equivalence for configurations)
e ≈L e
′ Σ.φ ≈L Σ′.φ Σ.lbl= Σ′.lbl Σ.clr= Σ′.clr Σ.lbl⊑ L
〈Σ,e〉 ≈L 〈Σ′,e′〉
Σ.φ ≈L Σ′.φ Σ.lbl 6⊑ L Σ′.lbl 6⊑ L
〈Σ,e〉 ≈L 〈Σ′,e′〉
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In the above definition, it is worth remarking that we do not require ≈L for expressions when the current
label does not flow to L. This omission comes from the fact that e and e′ would be reduced to • when
applying our simulation between −→∗ and −→∗L (recall Figure 5).
The next theorem shows the non-interference policy. It essentially states that given two inputs with
possibly secret information, the result of the computation is indistinguishable to an attacker. In other
words, there is no information-flow from confidential data to outputs observable by the attacker.
Theorem 1 (Non-interference)
Given a computation e (with no •, ( )LIO, Lb, or Xl) where Γ ⊢ e : Labeled ℓ τ → LIO ℓ (Labeled ℓ τ ′),
environments Σ1 and Σ2 where Σ1.φ = Σ2.φ = /0, security label l, an attacker at level L such that l ⊑ L,
then
∀e1e2.(Γ ⊢ ei : Labeled ℓ τ)i=1,2∧ (ei = Lb l e′i)i=1,2∧〈Σ1,e1〉 ≈L 〈Σ2,e2〉
∧ 〈Σ1,e e1〉 −→∗ 〈Σ′1,(v1)LIO〉∧ 〈Σ2,e e2〉 −→∗ 〈Σ′2,(v2)LIO〉
=⇒ 〈Σ′1,(v1)LIO〉 ≈L 〈Σ′2,(v2)LIO〉
Proof
From Lemma 3 and determinacy of −→∗L. The details are shown in Appendix C.
Observe that even though we assume that the input labeled values e1 and e2 are observable by the attacker
(l ⊑ L), they might contain confidential data. For instance, e1 could be of the form Lb l (Lb l′ true) where
l′ 6⊑ L.
5.2 Confinement
In this section we present the formal guarantees that LIO computations cannot modify data below their
current label or above their current clearance.
We start by proving that the current label of an LIO computation does not decrease.
Proposition 4 (Monotonicity of the current label)
If Γ ⊢ e : τ and 〈Σ,e〉 −→∗ 〈Σ′,e′〉, then Σ.lbl⊑ Σ′.lbl.
Proof
By induction on expressions, evaluation contexts, and reduction rules.
Similarly, we show that the current clearance of an LIO computation never increases.
Proposition 5 (Monotonicity of the current clearance)
If Γ ⊢ e : τ and 〈Σ,e〉 −→∗ 〈Σ′,e′〉, then Σ′.clr⊑ Σ.clr.
Proof
By induction on expressions, evaluation contexts, and reduction rules.
Proposition 4 and 5 are crucial to assert that once an LIO computation reads confidential data, it cannot
lower its current label to leak it. Similarly, a computation should not be able to arbitrarily increase its
clearance; doing so would allow it to read any data with no access restrictions.
Before delving into the confinement theorems, we first define a store modifier that removes all store
elements with a label that does not flow to l.
Definition 5 (Label-based reference-cell removal)
Flexible Dynamic Information Flow Control in the Presence of Exceptions 25
Modifier (Σ.φ)↓l retains all the labeled references with a label below l, usually the current label:
(Σ.φ)↓l = Σ.φ \ {(a,Lb l′ e) : a ∈ dom(Σ.φ)∧ l′ 6⊑ l}
And, dually, a store modifier that removes all store elements below a given clearance l.
Definition 6 (Clearance-based reference-cell removal)
(Σ.φ)↑l = Σ.φ \ {(a,Lb l′ e) : a ∈ dom(Σ.φ)∧ l 6⊑ l′}
This store modifier retains all the labeled references with a label that is not below l, usually the current
clearance. We now present the first confinement theorem.
Theorem 2 (Store confinement)
Given labels l and lc, a computation e (with no •, a, ( )LIO, Lb, or Xl′ ) such that Γ ⊢ e : LIO ℓ τ , and
environment Σ[lbl 7→ l,clr 7→ lc] where l ⊑ lc, then
〈Σ,e〉 −→∗ 〈Σ′,(v)LIO〉 =⇒ (Σ.φ)↓l = (Σ′.φ)↓l ∧ (Σ.φ)↑lc = (Σ′.φ)↑lc
Proof
By contradiction on creating and modifying labeled references with labels not boded by the current label
and clearance, using Propositions 4 and 5.
Intuitively, this theorem states that no new references with a label not bounded by the initial current label
and current clearance can be created. And, computation e is confined to modifying references between l
and lc.
Our second confinement theorem states that a return labeled value comes either from some part of the
store (recall that labeled values can be nested) or might be computed when its security level is between
the current label and clearance.
Theorem 3 (Labeled creation confinement)
Given labels l, lc, and lv, a computation e (with no •, a, ( )LIO, Lb, or Xl′ ) where Γ⊢ e : LIO ℓ (Labeled ℓ τ),
and environment Σ[lbl 7→ l,clr 7→ lc] such that l ⊑ lc, then
〈Σ,e〉 −→∗ 〈Σ′,(Lb lv e1)LIO〉 =⇒ l ⊑ lv ⊑ lc∨∃(a,Lb l1 e′1) ∈ Σ.φ .Lb lv e1 ǫ˜ e′1∧ l1 ⊑ lc
Here, operator ǫ˜ is defined as the syntactic appearance of the left-hand expression into the right-hand side
operand.
Proof
By induction on expressions and evaluation contexts and using Propositions 4 and 5.
6 Related Work
Heintze and Riecke (Heintze & Riecke, 1998) consider security for lambda-calculus where lambda-terms
are explicitly annotated with security labels, for a type-system that guarantees non-interference. One
of the key aspects of their work consists of an operator which raises the security annotation of a term
in a similar manner to our raise of the current label when manipulating labeled values. Similar ideas of
floating labels have been used by many operating systems, dating back to the High-Water-Mark security
model (Landwehr, 1981) of the ADEPT-50 in the late 1960s. Asbestos (Efstathopoulos et al., 2005) first
combined floating labels with the Decentralized label model
26 D. Stefan, A. Russo, J. C. Mitchell, and D. Mazie`res
Abadi et al. (Abadi et al., 1999) develop the dependency core calculus (DCC) based on a hierarchy of
monads to guarantee non-interference. In their calculus, they define a monadic type that “protects” (the
confidentiality of) side-effect-free values at different security levels. Though not a monad, our Labeled
type similarly protects pure values at various security levels. To manipulate such values, DCC uses a
non-standard typing rule for the bind operator; the essence of this operator, in a dynamic setting with
side-effectful computations, is captured in our library through the interaction of of Labeled, unlabel,
and LIO.
Tse and Zdancewic (Tse & Zdancewic, 2004) translate DCC to System F and show that non-interference
can be stated using the parametricity theorem for System F. The authors also provide a Haskell implemen-
tation for a two-point lattice. Their implementation encodes each security level as an abstract data type
constructed from functions and binding operations to compose computations with permitted flows. Since
they consider the same non-standard features for the bind operation as in DCC, they provide as many
definitions for bind as different type of values produced by it. Moreover, their implementation needs to
be compiled with the flag -fallow-undecidable-instances, in GHC. Our work, in contrast, defines
only one bind operation for LIO, without the need for such compiler extensions.
Harrison and Hook show how to implement an abstract operating system called separation kernel
(Harrison, 2005). Programs running under this multi-threading operating system satisfy non-interference.
To achieve this, the authors rely on the state monad to represent threads, monad transformers to present
parallel composition, and the resumption monad to achieve communication between threads. Conse-
quently, non-interference is enforced by the scheduler implementation, which only allow signaling threads
at the same, or higher, security level as the thread that issued the signal. The authors use monads differently
from us; their goal is to construct secure kernels rather than provide information-flow security as a library.
Our library is simpler and more suitable for writing sequential programs in Haskell. Extending our library
to include concurrency is stated as a future work.
Crary et al. (Crary et al., 2005) design a monadic calculus for non-interference for programs with mu-
table state. Similar to our work, their language distinguishes between term and expressions, where terms
are pure and expressions are (possibly) effectful computations. Their calculus mainly tracks information
flow by statically approximating the security levels of effects produced by expressions. Compared to
their work, we only need to make approximations of the side-effects of a given computation when using
toLabeled; the state of LIO keeps track of the dynamic security level upper bound of observed data.
Overall, our dynamic approach is more flexible and permissive than their proposed type-system.
Pottier and Simonet (Pottier & Simonet, 2002; Simonet, 2003) designed FlowCaml, a compiler to en-
force non-interference for OCaml programs. Rather than implementing a compiler from scratch, and more
similar to our approach, the seminal work by Li and Zdancewic (Li & Zdancewic, 2006) presents an
implementation of information-flow security as a library, in Haskell, using a generalization of monads
called Arrows (Hughes, 2000). Extending their work, Tsai et al. (chung Tsai et al., 2007) further consider
side-effects and concurrency. Contributing to library-based approaches, Russo et al. (Russo et al., 2008)
eliminate the need for Arrows by showing an IFC library based solely on monads. Their library defines
monadic types to track information-flow in pure and side-effectful computations. Compared to our dy-
namic IFC library, Russo et al.’s library is slightly less permissive and leverages Haskell’s type-system
to statically enforce non-interference. However, we note that our library has similar (though dynamic)
functions provided by their SecIO library; similar to unlabel, they provide a function that maps pure
labeled values into side-effectful computations; similar to toLabeled, they provide a function that allows
reading/writing secret files into computations related to public data.
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Morgenstern et al. (Morgenstern & Licata, 2010) encoded an authorization- and IFC-aware program-
ming language in Agda. Their encoding, however, does not consider computations with side-effects.
More closely related, Devriese and Piessens (Devriese & Piessens, 2011) used monad transformers and
parametrized monads (Atkey, 2006) to enforce non-interference, both dynamically and statically. How-
ever, their work focuses on modularity (separating IFC enforcement from underlying user API), using
type-class level tricks that make it difficult to understand errors triggered by insecurities. Moreover,
compared to our work, where programmers write standard Haskell code, their work requires one to firstly
encode programs as values of a specific type.
Compared to other language-based works, LIO uses the notion of clearance. The work of Bell and
La Padula (Bell & Padula, 1976) formalized clearance as a bound on the current label of a particular users’
processes. In the 1980s, clearance became a requirement for high-assurance secure systems purchased by
the US Department of Defense (Department of Defense, 1985). More recently, HiStar (Zeldovich et al., 2006)
re-cast clearance as a bound on the label of any resource created by the process (where raising a process’s
label is but one means of creating a something with a higher label). We adopt HiStar’s more stringent
notion of clearance, which prevents software from copying data it cannot read and facilitates bounding
the time during which possibly untrustworthy software can exploit covert channels.
Simultaneously to this work, Hedin and Sabelfeld have recently published a dynamic information-flow
monitor for a core part of Javascript which handles exceptions (Hedin & Sabelfeld, 2012). Their approach
needs to explicitly mark in the code (through non-standard constructors) which exceptions are thrown
under a secret branch. Our approach, in contrast, simple raises an exception labeled with the current label.
7 Conclusion
We propose a new design point for IFC systems in which most values in lexical scope are protected by a
single, mutable, current label, yet one can also encapsulate and pass around the results of computations
with different labels. Unlike other language-based work, our model provides a notion of clearance that
imposes an upper bound on the program label, thus providing a form of discretionary access control on
portions of the code.
We prove information flow and integrity properties of our design and describe LIO, an implementation
of the new model in Haskell. LIO, which can be implemented entirely as a library, demonstrates both the
applicability and simplicity of the approach. We show the capabilities of the library to perform secure
side-effects (e.g., references) as well as safely handle exceptions. Our non-interference theorem proves
the conventional property that lower-level results do not depend on higher-level inputs – the label system
prevents inappropriate flow of information. We also prove confinement theorems that show the effect of
clearance on the behavior of code. In effect, lowering the clearance imposes a discretionary form of access
control by preventing subsequent code (within that scope) from accessing higher-level information.
As an illustration of the benefits and expressive power of this system, we describe a reviewing system
that uses LIO labels to manage integrity and confidentiality in an environment where users and labels
are added dynamically. Although we have use LIO for the λ Chair API and even built a relatively large
web-framework that securely integrates untrusted third-party applications, we believe that changes in the
constructs are likely to occur as the language matures. This further supports our library-based approach to
language-based security.
28 D. Stefan, A. Russo, J. C. Mitchell, and D. Mazie`res
Acknowledgments This work was funded by DARPA CRASH under contract #N66001-10-2-4088, by
multiple gifts from Google, and by the Swedish research agencies VR and STINT. D. Stefan is supported
by the DoD through the NDSEG Fellowship Program.
References
Abadi, M., Banerjee, A., Heintze, N., & Riecke, J. 1999 (Jan.). A Core Calculus of Dependency. Pages 147–160 of:
Proc. acm symp. on principles of programming languages.
Askarov, Aslan, & Sabelfeld, Andrei. (2009). Tight enforcement of information-release policies for dynamic
languages. Proceedings of the 22nd ieee computer security foundations symposium. IEEE Computer Society.
Askarov, Aslan, Hunt, Sebastian, Sabelfeld, Andrei, & Sands, David. (2008). Termination-insensitive noninterference
leaks more than just a bit. Pages 333–348 of: Proc. of the 13th european symp. on research in computer security.
Springer-Verlag.
Atkey, Robert. (2006). Parameterised notions of computation. Pages 31–45 of: Workshop on mathematically
structured functional programming, ed. Conor McBride and Tarmo Uustalu. Electronic Workshops in Computing,
British Computer Society.
Austin, T. H., & Flanagan, C. 2009 (June). Efficient purely-dynamic information flow analysis. Proc. acm workshop
on programming languages and analysis for security (plas).
Austin, T. H., & Flanagan, C. 2010 (June). Permissive dynamic information flow analysis. Proc. acm workshop on
programming languages and analysis for security (plas).
Banerjee, A., & Naumann, D.A. (2005). Stack-based access control and secure information flow. Journal of functional
programming, 15(02), 131–177.
Bell, David E., & Padula, Leonard La. 1976 (March). Secure computer system: Unified exposition and multics
interpretation. Tech. rept. MTR-2997, Rev. 1. MITRE Corp., Bedford, MA.
Biba, K. J. (1977). Integrity considerations for secure computer systems. ESD-TR-76-372.
chung Tsai, Ta, Russo, A., & Hughes, J. 2007 (July). A library for secure multi-threaded information flow in Haskell.
Crary, Karl, Kliger, Aleksey, & Pfenning, Frank. (2005). A monadic analysis of information flow security with
mutable state. Journal of functional programming, 15(March), 249–291.
Denning, Dorothy E. (1976). A lattice model of secure information flow. Communications of the ACM, 19(5),
236–243.
Denning, Dorothy E., & Denning, Peter J. (1977). Certification of programs for secure information flow.
Communications of the ACM, 20(7), 504–513.
Department of Defense. 1985 (December). Trusted computer system evaluation criteria (orange book). DoD 5200.28-
STD edn. Department of Defense.
Devriese, Dominique, & Piessens, Frank. (2011). Information flow enforcement in monadic libraries. Proc. of the
7th ACM SIGPLAN Workshop on Types in Language Design and Implementation. New York, NY, USA: ACM.
Efstathopoulos, Petros, Krohn, Maxwell, VanDeBogart, Steve, Frey, Cliff, Ziegler, David, Kohler, Eddie, Mazie`res,
David, Kaashoek, Frans, & Morris, Robert. 2005 (October). Labels and event processes in the Asbestos operating
system.
Felleisen, Mattias. (1988). The theory and practice of first-class prompts. Pages 180–190 of: Proc. of the 15th acm
sigplan-sigact symp. on principles of programming languages. ACM.
Goguen, J.A., & Meseguer, J. 1982 (April). Security policies and security models.
Harrison, William L. (2005). Achieving information flow security through precise control of effects. Pages 16–30 of:
In 18th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. IEEE Computer Society.
Hedin, D., & Sabelfeld, A. 2012 (June). Information-flow security for a core of JavaScript.
Hedin, D., & Sands, David. (2006). Noninterference in the presence of non-opaque pointers. Proc. of the 19th ieee
computer security foundations workshop. IEEE Computer Society Press.
Flexible Dynamic Information Flow Control in the Presence of Exceptions 29
Heintze, N., & Riecke, J. G. 1998 (Jan.). The SLam calculus: programming with secrecy and integrity. Pages 365–377
of: Proc. acm symp. on principles of programming languages.
Hughes, J. (2000). Generalising monads to arrows. Science of computer programming, 37(1–3), 67–111.
Hunt, Sebastian, & Sands, David. (2006). On flow-sensitive security types. Pages 79–90 of: Conference record of the
33rd acm sigplan-sigact symp. on principles of programming languages. POPL ’06. ACM.
Landwehr, Carl E. (1981). Formal models for computer security. Computing survels, 13(3), 247–278.
Leroy, X., & Rouaix, F. (1998). Security properties of typed applets. Pages 391–403 of: Proc. of the 25th acm
sigplan-sigact symp. on principles of programming languages. ACM.
Li, P., & Zdancewic, S. (2006). Encoding Information Flow in Haskell. Csfw ’06: Proc. of the 19th ieee workshop on
computer security foundations. IEEE Computer Society.
Li, P., & Zdancewic, S. (2010). Arrows for secure information flow. Theoretical computer science, 411(19), 1974–
1994.
Morgenstern, Jamie, & Licata, Daniel R. (2010). Security-typed programming within dependently typed
programming. Proc. of the 15th ACM SIGPLAN International Conference on Functional Programming. ICFP
’10. ACM.
Myers, Andrew C., & Liskov, Barbara. (1997). A decentralized model for information flow control. Pages 129–142
of: Proc. of the 16th acm symp. on operating systems principles.
Pottier, F., & Simonet, V. 2002 (Jan.). Information flow inference for ML. Pages 319–330 of: Proc. acm symp. on
principles of programming languages.
Russo, A., & Sabelfeld, A. 2009 (July). Securing timeout instructions in web applications.
Russo, Alejandro, & Sabelfeld, Andrei. (2010). Dynamic vs. static flow-sensitive security analysis. Pages 186–199
of: Proc. of the 2010 23rd ieee computer security foundations symp. CSF ’10. IEEE Computer Society.
Russo, Alejandro, Claessen, Koen, & Hughes, John. (2008). A library for light-weight information-flow security in
Haskell.
Sabelfeld, A., & Russo, A. 2009 (June). From dynamic to static and back: Riding the roller coaster of information-
flow control research. Proc. andrei ershov international conference on perspectives of system informatics.
Sabelfeld, Andrei, & Myers, Andrew C. (2003). Language-based information-flow security. Ieee journal on selected
areas in communications, 21(1).
Simonet, V. 2003 (July). The Flow Caml system. Software release. Located at
http://cristal.inria.fr/~simonet/soft/flowcaml/.
Stefan, Deian, Russo, Alejandro, Mazie`res, David, & Mitchell, John C. (2011a). Disjunction category labels. Nordsec
2011. LNCS. Springer.
Stefan, Deian, Russo, Alejandro, Mitchell, John C., & Mazie`res, David. 2011b (September). Flexible dynamic
information flow control in Haskell. Pages 95–106 of: Haskell symposium. ACM SIGPLAN.
Tse, S., & Zdancewic, S. (2004). Translating dependency into parametricity. Proc. of the ninth acm sigplan
international conference on functional programming. ACM.
Zeldovich, Nickolai, Boyd-Wickizer, Silas, Kohler, Eddie, & Mazie`res, David. 2006 (November). Making information
flow explicit in HiStar.
30 D. Stefan, A. Russo, J. C. Mitchell, and D. Mazie`res
A Standard Static and Dynamic Semantics
For completeness, in this section, we provide the evaluation and typing rules for standard terms and
expressions. Figure 8 defines the set of evaluation contexts and reduction rules for standard constructs
in our language. Substitution ([e1/x] e2) is defined in the usual way: homomorphic on all operators and
renaming bound names to avoid captures. Figure 9 describes the typing rules for terms; Figure 10 describes
the typing rules for expressions.
Figure 8 Operational semantics for standard terms.
E ::= [·] | Lb E e | E e | pii E | if E then e else e
〈Σ,E[(λ x.e1) e2]〉 −→ 〈Σ,E[[e2/x]e1]〉
〈Σ,E[fix e]〉 −→ 〈Σ,E[e (fix e)]〉
〈Σ,E[pii (e1,e2)]〉 −→ 〈Σ,E[ei]〉
〈Σ,E[if true then e1 else e2]〉 −→ 〈Σ,E[e1]〉
〈Σ,E[if false then e1 else e2]〉 −→ 〈Σ,E[e2]〉
〈Σ,E[let x = e1 in e2]〉 −→ 〈Σ,E[[e1/x]e2]〉
Figure 9 Typing rules for standard terms.
⊢ true : Bool ⊢ false : Bool ⊢ () : ()
Γ(x) = τ
Γ ⊢ x : τ
Γ[x 7→ τ1] ⊢ e : τ2
Γ ⊢ λ x.e : τ1 → τ2
Γ ⊢ e1 : τ1 Γ ⊢ e2 : τ2
Γ ⊢ (e1,e2) : (τ1,τ2)
Γ ⊢ e : τ → τ
Γ ⊢ fix e : τ
Γ ⊢ e : τ
Γ ⊢ (e)LIO : LIO ℓ τ
Γ ⊢ • : τ
Figure 10 Typing rules for standard expressions.
Γ ⊢ e1 : τ1 → τ2 Γ ⊢ e2 : τ1
Γ ⊢ e1 e2 : τ2
Γ ⊢ e : (τ1,τ2)
Γ ⊢ pii e : τi
Γ ⊢ e1 : Bool Γ ⊢ e2 : τ Γ ⊢ e3 : τ
Γ ⊢ if e1 then e2 else e3 : τ
Γ ⊢ e1 : τ1 Γ[x 7→ τ1] ⊢ e2 : τ2
Γ ⊢ let x = e1 in e2 : τ2
Γ ⊢ e : τ
Γ ⊢ return e : LIO ℓ τ
Γ ⊢ e1 : LIO ℓ τ1 Γ ⊢ e2 : τ1 → LIO ℓ τ2
Γ ⊢ e1 >>= e2 : LIO ℓ τ2
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B Erasure function
In this section we define the erasure function εL, introduced in Section 5 for the remaining expressions
(Figure 11) and evaluation contexts (Figure 12).
Figure 11 Erasure function for expressions.
εL(e e) = εL(e) εL(e) εL(pii e) = pii εL(e)
εL(if e then e else e) = if εL(e) then εL(e) else εL(e)
εL(let x = e in e) = let x = εL(e) in εL(e) εL(return e) = return εL(e)
εL(label e e) = label εL(e) εL(e) εL(unlabel e) = unlabel εL(e)
εL(toLabeled e e) = toLabeled εL(e) εL(e) εL(newLIORef e e) = newLIORef εL(e) εL(e)
εL(readLIORef e) = readLIORef εL(e) εL(writeLIORef e e) = writeLIORef εL(e) εL(e)
εL(throwLIO e) = throwLIO εL(e) εL(catch e e) = catch εL(e) εL(e)
εL(lowerClr e) = lowerClr εL(e) εL(getLabel) = getLabel
εL(getClearance) = getClearance εL(labelOf e) = labelOf εL(e)
εL(labelOfRef e) = labelOfRef εL(e)
Figure 12 Erasure function for evaluation contexts.
εL(Lb E e) = Lb εL(E) εL(e) εL(E e) = εL(E) εL(e) εL(pii E) = pii εL(E)
εL(if E then e else e) = if εL(E) then εL(e) else εL(e) εL(return E) = return εL(E)
εL(E >>= e) = εL(E) >>= εL(e) εL(label E e) = label εL(E) εL(e)
εL(unlabel E) = unlabel εL(E) εL(toLabeled E e) = toLabeled εL(E) εL(e)
εL(newLIORef E e) = newLIORef εL(E) εL(e) εL(readLIORef E) = readLIORef εL(E)
εL(writeLIORef E e) = writeLIORef εL(E) εL(e) εL(throwLIO E) = throwLIO εL(E)
εL(catch E e) = catch εL(E) εL(e) εL(lowerClr E) = lowerClr εL(E)
εL(labelOf E) = labelOf εL(E) εL(labelOfRef E) = labelOfRef εL(E)
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C Detailed proofs
In this section, we provide expand the proof details for the results in Section 5.
Proposition 3 (Properties of erasure function)
1. εL(E[e]) = εL(E)[εL(e)] 4. εL(εL(E)) = εL(E)
2. εL([e2/x]e1) = [εL(e2)/x]εL(e1) 5. εL(εL(Σ)) = εL(Σ)
3. εL(εL(e)) = εL(e) 6. εL(εL(〈Σ,e〉)) = εL(〈Σ,e〉)
Proof
All follow from the definition of the erasure function εL, and induction on expressions and evaluation
contexts,
1. By induction on expressions and evaluation contexts. We show several cases of the base case
analysis on evaluation contexts.
(a) Let E := Lb [ ] e0, it follows that εL(E) := Lb [ ] εL(e0), and εL(E[e])= εL(Lb e e0)= Lb εL(e) εL(e0)=
εL(E)[εL(e)].
(b) Let E := [ ] e0, it follows that εL(E) := [ ] εL(e0), and εL(E[e]) = εL(e e0) = εL(e) εL(e0) =
εL(E)[εL(e)].
(c) Let E := pii [ ], it follows that εL(E) := pii [ ], and εL(E[e]) = εL(pii e) = pii εL(e) = εL(E)[εL(e)].
2. By expansion εL([e2/x]e1)= εL((λ x.e1) e2), from which we have εL(λ x.e1) εL(e2)= [εL(e2)/x]εL(e1).
3. Directly from definition of the erasure function and induction on expressions.
4. Directly from definition of the erasure function and induction on expressions and evaluation con-
texts.
5. Directly from definition of the erasure function on stores and property 3 above.
6. Directly from definition of the erasure function on configurations and properties 3 and 5, above.
Lemma 1 (Single-step simulation without toLabeled )
If Γ ⊢ e : τ and 〈Σ,e〉 −→ 〈Σ′,e′〉 where toLabeled is not executed, then Γ ⊢ e′ : τ and εL(〈Σ,e〉) −→L
εL(〈Σ′,e′〉).
Proof
Part of the lemma shows subject reduction, which is proved by showing that a reduction step does not
change the types of references in the store Σ.φ and then applying induction on the typing derivations.
It remains then to show the simulation, which follows by induction on evaluation contexts and cases
analysis on terms and expressions. For clarity, we omit the environment in cases where it is not essential.
Unless otherwise stated, we assume that Σ.lbl⊑ L ⊑ Σ.clr, the proof for the case where L is below the
current label is straight forward since the εL erases any expression in a configuration to a hole. Conversely,
the case where L is above the current clerance is identical to the case where L is equal to the current
clearance.
We show the simulation for several exemplary/interesting cases, the remaining cases follow similarly.
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◮ Case E[(λ x.e1) e2]−→ E[[e2/x]e1]:
εL(E[(λ x.e1) e2]) = εL(E)[εL((λ x.e1) e2)]
= εL(E)[(λ x.εL(e1)) εL(e2)]
−→L εL(εL(E)[[εL(e2)/x]εL(e1)])
= εL(εL(E))[εL([εL(e2)/x]εL(e1))]
= εL(E)[εL([εL(e2)/x]εL(e1))]
= εL(E)[[εL(e2)/x]εL(e1)]
= εL(E)[εL([e2/x]e1)] = εL(E[[e2/x]e1])
by Proposition 3.
◮ Case 〈Σ,E[return v]〉 −→ 〈Σ,E[(v)LIO]〉:
— Σ.lbl⊑ L:
εL(〈Σ,E[return v]〉)
= 〈εL(Σ),εL(E[return v])〉
= 〈εL(Σ),εL(E)[return εL(v)]〉
−→L εL(〈εL(Σ),εL(E)[(εL(v))LIO]〉)
= 〈εL(Σ),εL(E)[(εL(v))LIO]〉
= 〈εL(Σ),εL(E)[εL((v)LIO)]〉
= 〈εL(Σ),εL(E[(v)LIO])〉= εL(〈Σ,E[(v)LIO]〉)
by definition of εL and Proposition 3.
— Σ.lbl 6⊑ L:
εL(〈Σ,E[return v]〉) = 〈εL(Σ),•〉
−→L εL(〈εL(Σ),•〉) = 〈εL(Σ),•〉= εL(〈Σ,E[(v)LIO]〉)
by definition of εL and Proposition 3.
This illustrates the approach used to prove simulation of most cases. Moreover, it shows the trivial
case for Σ.lbl 6⊑ L.
◮ Case 〈Σ,E[(Xl)LIO >>= e]〉 −→ 〈Σ,E[(Xl)LIO]〉
— l ⊑ L:
εL(〈Σ,E[(Xl)LIO >>= e]〉)
= 〈εL(Σ),εL(E)[(εL(Xl))LIO >>= εL(e)]〉
= 〈εL(Σ),εL(E)[(Xl)LIO >>= εL(e)]〉
−→L εL(〈εL(Σ),εL(E)[(Xl)LIO]〉)
= 〈εL(Σ),εL(E)[(εL(Xl))LIO]〉
= 〈εL(Σ),εL(E)[εL((Xl)LIO)]〉
= 〈εL(Σ),εL(E[(Xl)LIO])〉= εL(〈Σ,E[(Xl)LIO]〉)
by definition of εL and Proposition 3.
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— l 6⊑ L:
εL(〈Σ,E[(Xl)LIO >>= e]〉)
= 〈εL(Σ),εL(E)[(•)LIO]〉
−→L εL(〈εL(Σ),εL(E)[(•)LIO]〉)
= 〈εL(Σ),εL(E)[(•)LIO]〉
= 〈εL(Σ),εL(E)[(εL(Xl))LIO]〉
= 〈εL(Σ),εL(E)[εL((Xl)LIO)]〉
= 〈εL(Σ),εL(E[(Xl)LIO])〉= εL(〈Σ,E[(Xl)LIO]〉)
by definition of εL and Proposition 3.
◮ Case
Σ.lbl⊑ l ⊑ Σ.clr
〈Σ,E[label l e]〉 −→ 〈Σ,E[return (Lb l e)]〉
:
— l ⊑ L:
εL(〈Σ,E[label l e]〉)
= 〈εL(Σ),εL(E)[label l εL(e)]〉
−→L εL(〈εL(Σ),εL(E)[return (Lb l εL(e))]〉)
= 〈εL(Σ),εL(E)[return (Lb l εL(e))]〉
= 〈εL(Σ),εL(E)[εL(return (Lb l e))]〉
= εL(〈Σ,E[return (Lb l e)]〉)
— l 6⊑ L:
εL(〈Σ,E[label l e]〉)
= 〈εL(Σ),εL(E)[label l εL(e)]〉
−→L εL(〈εL(Σ),εL(E)[return (Lb l εL(e))]〉)
= 〈εL(Σ),εL(E)[return (Lb l •)]〉
= 〈εL(Σ),εL(E)[εL(return (Lb l e))]〉
= εL(〈Σ,E[return (Lb l e)]〉)
◮ Case
l′ = Σ.lbl⊔ l l′ ⊑ Σ.clr Σ′ = Σ[lbl 7→ l′]
〈Σ,E[unlabel (Lb l e)]〉 −→ 〈Σ′,E[return e]〉
:
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— l ⊑ L:
εL(〈Σ,E[unlabel (Lb l e)]〉)
= 〈εL(Σ),εL(E[unlabel (Lb l e)])〉
= 〈εL(Σ),εL(E)[unlabel (Lb l εL(e))]〉
−→L 〈εL(εL(Σ1)),εL(εL(E)[return (εL(e))])〉
= 〈εL(Σ1),εL(E)[return εL(e)]〉
= 〈εL(Σ1),εL(E)[εL(return e)]〉
= 〈εL(Σ1),εL(E[return e])〉
= 〈εL(Σ′),εL(E[return e])〉
= εL(〈Σ′,E[return e]〉)
where εL(Σ1) = εL(Σ[lbl 7→ l′]), and thus it directly follows that εL(Σ1) = εL(Σ′).
— l 6⊑ L:
εL(〈Σ,E[unlabel (Lb l e)]〉)
= 〈εL(Σ),εL(E[unlabel (Lb l e)])〉
= 〈εL(Σ),εL(E)[unlabel (Lb l •)]〉
−→L εL(〈εL(Σ1),εL(E)[return •]〉)
= 〈εL(εL(Σ1)),•〉
= εL(〈Σ′,E[return e]〉)
The last steps holds, as in the second case of return, because Σ′.lbl 6⊑ L and any term is erased
to •. Similarly, εL(Σ1) = εL(Σ′) follows as before.
◮ We show an example case of the “violating rules”:
l 6⊑ Σ.clr
〈Σ,E[unlabel (Lb l e)]〉 −→ 〈Σ,E[throwLIO X ]〉
:
— l ⊑ L:
εL(〈Σ,E[unlabel (Lb l e)]〉)
= 〈εL(Σ),εL(E[unlabel (Lb l e)])〉
= 〈εL(Σ),εL(E)[unlabel (Lb l εL(e))]〉
−→L 〈εL(εL(Σ)),εL(εL(E)[throwLIO X ])〉
〈εL(Σ),εL(E)[throwLIO εL(X)]〉
〈εL(Σ),εL(E)[throwLIO X ]〉
〈εL(Σ),εL(E)[εL(throwLIO X)]〉
= εL(〈Σ,E[throwLIO X ]〉)
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— l 6⊑ L:
εL(〈Σ,E[unlabel (Lb l e)]〉)
= 〈εL(Σ),εL(E[unlabel (Lb l e)])〉
= 〈εL(Σ),εL(E)[unlabel (Lb l •)]〉
−→L 〈εL(εL(Σ)),εL(εL(E)[throwLIO X ])〉
〈εL(Σ),εL(E)[throwLIO εL(X)]〉
〈εL(Σ),εL(E)[throwLIO X ]〉
〈εL(Σ),εL(E)[εL(throwLIO X)]〉
= εL(〈Σ,E[throwLIO X ]〉)
◮ Case
Σ.lbl⊑ l ⊑ Σ.clr Σ′ = Σ.φ [a 7→ Lb l e]
〈Σ,E[newLIORef l e]〉 −→ 〈Σ′,E[return a]〉
a fresh:
— l ⊑ L:
εL(〈Σ,E[newLIORef l e]〉)
= 〈εL(Σ),εL(E[newLIORef l e])〉
= 〈εL(Σ),εL(E)[newLIORef l εL(e)]
−→L 〈εL(εL(Σ1)),εL(εL(E)[return εL(a)])〉
= 〈εL(Σ1),εL(E[return a])〉
= εL(〈Σ′,E[return a]〉)〉,
where εL(Σ1) = εL(Σ).φ [a 7→ Lb l e], and so εL(Σ1) = εL(Σ′) follows directly.
— l 6⊑ L: as above. However, in this case, εL(Σ1) = εL(Σ).φ [a 7→ Lb l •]. From εL(Σ1).φ(a) =
εL(Lb l •) = εL(Lb l e) = εL(Σ′).φ(a) it follows that εL(Σ1) = εL(Σ′).
◮ Case
l′ = Σ.lbl⊔ l l′ ⊑ Σ.clr Σ′ = Σ[lbl 7→ l′]
〈Σ,E[catch (Xl)LIO e]〉 −→ 〈Σ′,E[e X ]〉
:
— l ⊑ L:
εL(〈Σ,E[catch (Xl)LIO e]〉)
= 〈εL(Σ),εL(E[catch (Xl)LIO εL(e)])〉
= 〈εL(Σ),εL(E)[catch (Xl)LIO εL(e)]〉
−→L 〈εL(εL(Σ1)),εL(εL(E)[εL(e) X ])〉
= 〈εL(Σ1),εL(E)[εL(e) εL(X)]〉
= 〈εL(Σ1),εL(E)[εL(e) X ]〉
= 〈εL(Σ1),εL(E)[εL(e X)]〉
= 〈εL(Σ1),εL(E[e X ])〉
= 〈εL(Σ′),εL(E[e X ])〉
= εL(〈Σ′,E[e X ]〉)
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where εL(Σ1) = εL(Σ[lbl 7→ l′]), and directly εL(Σ1) = εL(Σ′).
— l 6⊑ L:
εL(〈Σ,E[catch (Xl)LIO e]〉)
= 〈εL(Σ),εL(E[catch (Xl)LIO εL(e)])〉
= 〈εL(Σ),εL(E)[catch (•)LIOεL(e) ]〉
−→L εL(〈εL(Σ1),εL(E)[εL(e) •]〉)
= 〈εL(Σ1),•〉
= εL(〈Σ′,E[e X ]〉)
The last steps holds since Σ1.lbl 6⊑ L and any term is erased to •. As before, εL(Σ1) = εL(Σ′)
trivialy holds.
Lemma 3 (Simulation)
If Γ ⊢ e : τ and 〈Σ,e〉 −→∗ 〈Σ′,e′〉 then εL(〈Σ,e〉)−→∗L εL(〈Σ′,e′〉).
Proof
Lemma 2 shows the multi-step simulation for expressions that do not execute toLabeled. Thus, to
show the general multi-step simulation we must first show that toLabeled preserves the simulation.
The general simulation follows directly.
The proof for the simulation of toLabeled follows by induction on the number of executed toLabeled.
The base case consists of a single toLabeled. Specifically, for a computation with a single executed
toLabeled, we have:
〈Σ,e〉 −→∗ 〈Σ′,e′〉,
that can be expanded into
〈Σ,e〉 −→∗ 〈Σ0,E[toLabeled l e0]〉 −→ 〈Σ′′0,E[label l v]〉 −→∗ 〈Σ′,e′〉,
where 〈Σ0,e0〉 −→∗ 〈Σ′0,(v)LIO〉, and Σ′′0 = Σ′0[lbl 7→ Σ0.lbl,clr 7→ Σ0.clr]. The expansion highlights
the first occurrence of a toLabeled, and so e0, and e′ do not have any additional toLabeleds. From this
observation it is clear that the simulation of the base case follows directly by Lemma 2. Specifically, to
show the simulation for (TOLAB-1)
Σ0.lbl⊑ l ⊑ Σ0.clr
〈Σ0,e0〉 −→∗ 〈Σ′0,(v)LIO〉 Σ′0.lbl⊑ l Σ′′0 = Σ′0[lbl 7→ Σ0.lbl,clr 7→ Σ0.clr]
〈Σ0,E[toLabeled l e0]〉 −→ 〈Σ′′0,E[label l v]〉
,
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where e0 does not have any toLabeled we need only show the simulation of the conclusion; the simula-
tion of the big step in the premise follows directly from Lemma 2. We show this below:
εL(〈Σ0,E[toLabeled l (e0)LIO]〉)
= 〈εL(Σ0),εL(E[toLabeled l (e0)LIO])〉
= 〈εL(Σ0),εL(E)[toLabeled l (εL(e0))LIO]〉
−→L 〈εL(εL(Σ′′0)),εL(εL(E)[label l εL(v)])〉
= 〈εL(Σ′′0),εL(E)[label l εL(v)]〉
= 〈εL(Σ′′0),εL(E[label l v])〉
= εL(〈Σ′′0,E[label l v]〉)
Correspondingly, the simulation of the 〈Σ′′0,E[label l v]〉 −→∗ 〈Σ′,e′〉 step follows directly by Lemma 2.
The simulations of (TOLAB-2) follows similarly.
It is worth noting that the simulation of (BIND-1), as proved in Lemma 1, holds for exception labels,
irrespective of the current label. This is a necessary condition when a computation executes toLabeled
as the current label and exception label may not always be the same.
Our inductive hypothesis states that the simulation of
〈Σ,e〉 −→∗ 〈Σ′,e′〉,
holds for the case where toLabeled is executed k times. With this assumption, the simulation of
〈Σ,e〉 −→∗ 〈Σ′,e′〉,
with k+1 toLabeled executions, follows in a similar manner to the base case. Specifically, searching for
the first toLabeled and expanding, we have:
first big-step︷ ︸︸ ︷
〈Σ,e〉 −→∗ 〈Σ0,E[
second big-step︷ ︸︸ ︷
toLabeled l e0]〉 −→∗ 〈Σ′,e′〉
where at most k toLabeleds could have been executed in the first big-step, the inner computation e0, or
the second big-step. The simulation of all these execution steps follows by application of the inductive
hypothesis.
Theorem 1 (Non-interference)
Given a computation e (with no •, ( )LIO, Lb, or Xl) where Γ ⊢ e : Labeled ℓ τ → LIO ℓ (Labeled ℓ τ ′),
environments Σ1 and Σ2 where Σ1.φ = Σ2.φ = /0, security label l, an attacker at level L such that l ⊑ L,
then
∀e1e2.(Γ ⊢ ei : Labeled ℓ τ)i=1,2∧ (ei = Lb l e′i)i=1,2∧〈Σ1,e1〉 ≈L 〈Σ2,e2〉
∧ 〈Σ1,e e1〉 −→∗ 〈Σ′1,(v1)LIO〉∧ 〈Σ2,e e2〉 −→∗ 〈Σ′2,(v2)LIO〉
=⇒ 〈Σ′1,(v1)LIO〉 ≈L 〈Σ′2,(v2)LIO〉
Proof
From Lemma 3, for i = 1,2, we have
εL(〈Σi,e (Lb l e′i)〉)−→∗L εL(〈Σ′i,(vi)LIO〉),
where vi = Lb li e′′i or vi = Xl′′ . First we highlight that:
εL(〈Σ,e〉) = εL(〈Σ′,e′〉) =⇒ 〈Σ,e〉 ≈L 〈Σ′,e′〉
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Note that the converse is not necessarily true, since the stores may differ in the references with labels
above L. Then, from the determinacy of −→L, given in Proposition 2, and since the starting environment
configurations are the same (observe that 〈Σ1,e (Lb l e′1)〉 ≈L 〈Σ2,e (Lb l e′2)〉 =⇒ εL(〈Σ1,e (Lb l e′1)〉) =
εL(〈Σ2,e (Lb l e′2)〉) since Σ1.φ = Σ2.φ = /0), it must be that the end environment configurations also be
the same, i.e., εL(〈Σ′1,(v1)LIO〉) = εL(〈Σ′2,(v2)LIO〉). The L-equivalence directly follows from the above
observation.
For completeness, we detail the following cases:
◮ Case Σi.lbl 6⊑ L: We have
εL(〈Σi,e (Lb l e′i)〉) = 〈εL(Σi),•〉 −→∗L 〈εL(Σ′i),•〉= εL(〈Σ′i,(vi)LIO〉).
From the determinacy of −→L, it must be that the end environment configurations are the same,
from which it directly follows that 〈Σ′1,(v1)LIO〉 ≈L 〈Σ′2,(v2)LIO〉.
◮ Case Σi.lbl⊑ L∧Σ′i.lbl 6⊑ L: We have
εL(〈Σi,e (Lb l e′i)〉) = 〈εL(Σi),εL(e) (Lb l εL(e′i))〉 −→∗L 〈εL(Σ′i),•〉= εL(〈Σ′i,(vi)LIO〉).
As before, since the initial environment configurations are the same, from the determinacy of −→L
we end with the same configuration, which directly corresponds to L-equivalence.
◮ Case Σi.lbl⊑ L∧Σ′i.lbl⊑ L: We have
εL(〈Σi,e (Lb l e′i)〉) = 〈εL(Σi),εL(e) (Lb l εL(e′i))〉 −→∗L 〈εL(Σ′i),(vi)LIO〉.
From the determinacy of −→L, it must be that εL(Σ′1) = εL(Σ′2) and εL(v1) = εL(v2), and directly
〈Σ′1,(v1)LIO〉 ≈L 〈Σ′2,(v2)LIO〉.
Theorem 2 (Store confinement)
Given labels l and lc, a computation e (with no •, a, ( )LIO, Lb, or Xl′ ) such that Γ ⊢ e : LIO ℓ τ , and
environment Σ[lbl 7→ l,clr 7→ lc] where l ⊑ lc, then
〈Σ,e〉 −→∗ 〈Σ′,(v)LIO〉 =⇒ (Σ.φ)↓l = (Σ′.φ)↓l ∧ (Σ.φ)↑lc = (Σ′.φ)↑lc
Proof
By contradiction. We show the case of creating new referneces, the case of modifying an existing reference
follows similarly. Suppose that
◮ (Σ.φ)↓l 6= (Σ′.φ)↓l . Then, ∃(a,Lb lv ea) ∈ (Σ′.φ)↓l .(a,Lb lv ea) 6∈ (Σ.φ)↓l and l 6⊑ lv. Moreover,
(by Proposition 4) there must be a step at which point the new reference is created: 〈Σ′,e〉 −→∗
〈Σa,E[newLIORef lv ea]〉 −→∗ 〈Σ′,(v)LIO〉, such that (Σ.φ)↓l = (Σa.φ)↓l . However, by (NREF) it
must be that l ⊑ lv. Hence, we have a contradiction.
◮ (Σ.φ)↑lc 6= (Σ′.φ)↑lc . Then, ∃(a,Lb lv ea) ∈ (Σ′.φ)↑lc .(a,Lb lv ea) 6∈ (Σ.φ)↑lc and lv 6⊑ lc. Moreover,
(by Proposition 5) there must be a step at which point the new reference is created: 〈Σ′,e〉 −→∗
〈Σa,E[newLIORef lv ea]〉 −→∗ 〈Σ′,(v)LIO〉, such that (Σ.φ)↑lc = (Σa.φ)↑lc . However, by (NREF) it
must be that lv ⊑ lc. Hence, we have a contradiction.
Theorem 3 (Labeled creation confinement)
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Given labels l, lc, and lv, a computation e (with no •, a, ( )LIO, Lb, or Xl′ ) where Γ⊢ e : LIO ℓ (Labeled ℓ τ),
and environment Σ[lbl 7→ l,clr 7→ lc] such that l ⊑ lc, then
〈Σ,e〉 −→∗ 〈Σ′,(Lb lv e1)LIO〉 =⇒ l ⊑ lv ⊑ lc∨∃(a,Lb l1 e′1) ∈ Σ.φ .Lb lv e1 ǫ˜ e′1∧ l1 ⊑ lc
Here, operator ǫ˜ is defined as the syntactic appearance of the left-hand expression into the right-hand side
operand.
Proof
Since e cannot contain Lbs, the final labeled value must be created or retrieved from the store. By induction
on expressions and evaluation contexts and using Propositions 4 and 5 it must be that the label of the value
is bounded by the initial current label and clearance or the labeled value appears syntactically in the store.
The proof follows by case analysis on how a Labeled value can be obtained.
Suppose the value is created, i.e., 6 ∃(a,Lb l1 e′1) ∈ Σ.φ .Lb lv e1 ǫ˜ e′1 ∧ l1 ⊑ lc Then, there must be an
intermediate step where the labeled value is created. Specifically, 〈Σ,e〉 −→∗ 〈Σ1,E[label lv e1]〉 −→∗
〈Σ′,(Lb lv e1)LIO〉. (Recall that toLabeled also reduces to label, thus we need only handle this case.)
Hence, from rule (LAB) it must be that Σ1.lbl⊑ lv ⊑ Σ1.clr and by Propositions 4 and 5 it must be that
l ⊑ lv ⊑ lc.
Suppose that the value is not created with label. Then, ∃(a,Lb l1 e′1) ∈ Σ.φ .Lb lv e1 ǫ˜ e′1 and l1 ⊑ lc.
The l1 ⊑ lc must hold since there must be an intermediate step where the reference is read. Specifically,
〈Σ,e〉 −→∗ 〈Σ1,E[readLIORef a]〉 −→ 〈Σ′1,E[return e′1]〉 −→∗ 〈Σ′,(Lb lv e1)LIO〉. From rule (RREF) it
must be that l1 ⊑ Σ1.clr and by Proposition 5 it directly follows that l1 ⊑ lc. Because our semantics
does not have the evaluation context E ::= · · · | Lb e E , the values of references are not always evaluated
and thus the labeled value Lb lv e1 must syntactically appear in e′1. For example, if e1 = 2, it holds that
e1 ǫ˜ λ x.if x then (Lb lv 2) else (Lb lw 3), but not e1 ǫ˜ λ x.if x then (Lb lv (1+1)) else (Lb lw 3) for
some lw.
